Gujarat High CourtCriminal Procedure and EvidenceConstitutional Law

Two Complaints, No FIR: Gujarat HC Dismisses Man’s FIR Plea As He Bypassed Statutory Remedies

MOHAMMAD ASFAQKHAN MOHMAD ISHAHAQ KHANv.STATE OF GUJARAT

Two Complaints, No FIR: Gujarat HC Dismisses Man’s FIR Plea As He Bypassed Statutory Remedies. MOHAMMAD ASFAQKHAN MOHMAD ISHAHAQ KHAN vs STATE OF GUJARAT. Gujarat High Court. LawLens
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In brief

The question

Whether the High Court should entertain a writ petition seeking registration of an FIR when the petitioner has not first pursued the available statutory remedies.

The court held

The Court dismissed the petition as premature and devoid of merit at that stage.

It also directed

The Court granted the petitioner liberty to pursue the other efficacious remedies available under law. It made clear that it had not examined the merits of the case.

01Facts

The petitioner alleged that his written complaints dated 10 October 2025 and 28 November 2025, said to disclose cognizable offences, had not resulted in registration of an FIR.

pp. 1–2 · ¶ 1

He petitioned under Articles 21 and 226 seeking directions to register an FIR and investigate the complaints.

pp. 1–2 · ¶ 1

The State placed before the Court a police report stating that witness statements had been recorded and no cognizable offence was disclosed.

p. 3 · ¶ 5

The petitioner had approached the High Court without first pursuing the available statutory remedies.

p. 3 · ¶ 6

02Issues

i.Whether the High Court should entertain a writ petition seeking registration of an FIR when the petitioner has not first pursued the available statutory remedies.

pp. 3–6 · ¶ 6–9

ii.Whether the petitioner was entitled to a direction to register an FIR on the complaints in the circumstances of this case.

pp. 2–3 · ¶ 4–5 · p. 6 · ¶ 9

03Law Applied

Under Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P., (2008) 2 SCC 409, a person alleging non-registration of an FIR should ordinarily pursue the statutory sequence—approach the senior police officer under Sections 154(3) and 36 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and, if necessary, the Magistrate under Section 156(3), or file a complaint under Section 200; the existence of an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to writ jurisdiction, but ordinarily warrants declining interference.

pp. 3–5 · ¶ 7

The Court also relied on Sujal Vishwas Attavar v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 INSC 442, which describes the corresponding BNSS framework: Sections 173(1), 173(4), and 175(3) provide for approaching the police station, the Superintendent of Police, and then the Magistrate, respectively; writ jurisdiction should ordinarily not be invoked before those remedies are exhausted, absent circumstances warranting otherwise.

pp. 5–6 · ¶ 8

Provisions in the judgment · 7 · Linked ones open on LawLens

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Section 36Section 154Section 156Section 200Section 482

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 Section 173Section 175

04Reasoning

The Court found that the complaints had not led to FIR registration, but the petitioner had approached it directly without exhausting the statutory remedies available under the criminal procedure framework.

p. 3 · ¶ 6

Applying Sakiri Vasu and Sujal Vishwas Attavar, the Court held that the petitioner should first pursue those remedies and that the writ petition was premature. It therefore declined to examine whether the complaints disclosed a cognizable offence, expressly leaving the merits open.

pp. 3–6 · ¶ 7–9

05Holding

The Court dismissed the petition as premature and devoid of merit at that stage.

p. 6 · ¶ 9

The Court granted the petitioner liberty to pursue the other efficacious remedies available under law. It made clear that it had not examined the merits of the case.

p. 6 · ¶ 9
Gujarat High Court

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MOHAMMAD ASFAQKHAN MOHMAD ISHAHAQ KHANvsSTATE OF GUJARAT

Gujarat High Court · October 28, 2026

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