Under Section 56(2), electricity dues become first due upon billing, not inspection or consumption.

The Respondent was an electricity consumer classified under the HT Industrial Tariff. Following a 2012 MERC tariff order, laundry and dry-cleaning activities were required to be classified under the HT-II Commercial Tariff, but the Respondent continued to be billed under the industrial tariff.

After an inspection in November 2017, the Petitioner changed the tariff category and, in March 2018, issued a supplementary bill of ₹65,88,032 for December 2015 to November 2017.

The Respondent challenged the retrospective revision before the IGRC, CGRF and Electricity Ombudsman. The Ombudsman directed, inter alia, issuance of a revised supplementary bill and recovery in six instalments.

On review, the Ombudsman directed that the supplementary bill be restricted to March 2016–February 2018, being 24 months preceding the March 2018 bill.

The Petitioner implemented that order and quantified the dues at ₹41,86,458.40.

In December 2022, however, the Petitioner informed the Respondent that ₹56,96,670 was payable; the Respondent paid the amount, and the Petitioner issued a No Dues Certificate. The Respondent thereafter withdrew its pending writ petition challenging the earlier orders.

The Petitioner subsequently filed the present writ petition seeking permission to recover an additional amount of ₹22,09,178 for December 2015–February 2016 and challenging the Ombudsman’s restriction of recovery.

Whether the writ petition was liable to be dismissed for suppression of material facts, particularly the Respondent’s payment of the quantified dues and the Petitioner’s issuance of a No Dues Certificate before filing the petition?

Whether, under Section 56(2) of the Electricity Act, 2003 and the decisions in Assistant Engineer (D1), Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. Rahamatullah Khan and Prem Cottex v. Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd., the Petitioner could recover tariff differentials for December 2015–February 2016, beyond the period March 2016–February 2018 fixed by the Ombudsman?

Whether the impugned Electricity Ombudsman order dated 17 December 2019 restricting the revised supplementary bill to 24 months was illegal or required interference under Article 226?

Section 56(2) of the Electricity Act, 2003 provides that no sum due from a consumer is recoverable after two years from the date it became “first due,” unless continuously shown as recoverable as arrears, and also restricts disconnection of supply.

Relying on Assistant Engineer (D1), Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. Rahamatullah Khan, (2020) 4 SCC 650, the Court held that “first due” ordinarily refers to the date on which the bill is issued and that a supplementary demand may be raised after discovery of a bona fide billing mistake, although Section 56(2) limits coercive recovery measures.

The Court also relied on Prem Cottex v. Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd., 2021 SCC OnLine SC 870, which explained that Section 56(2) operates both against recovery and disconnection, and that the consumer’s obligation to pay arises upon issuance of the bill.

The Court further applied the principle that a party seeking writ relief must make full and candid disclosure of material facts.

The Court found that the Petitioner had suppressed material post-order events: before filing the present petition, it had itself quantified the outstanding amount, accepted payment of ₹56,96,670 and issued a No Dues Certificate.

Those facts directly undermined the Petitioner’s assertion that a surviving right of recovery remained.

On the merits, the Court held that the relevant supplementary bill was issued in March 2018; therefore, the Petitioner could not rely on the cited Supreme Court decisions to retrospectively extend recovery to 2015 merely because the billing error was discovered during the 2017 inspection.

The Court also emphasised that, during the review proceedings, the Petitioner had agreed to issue and recover a revised bill for the 24-month period from March 2016 to February 2018 and had assured compliance with the Ombudsman’s order.

Accordingly, the challenge was both procedurally defective due to suppression and substantively unsustainable, with no effective relief surviving after payment and issuance of the No Dues Certificate.

The petition was also liable to fail because of suppression of the Respondent’s payment and the No Dues Certificate issued before institution of the proceedings.

The Rule was discharged and no costs were awarded.