Unexplained delay of over two decades bars writ relief for enforcing a reinstatement award.

The petitioner joined Dhuri Cooperative Marketing-cum-Processing Societies Limited as a Clerk on 28 January 1992, but his services were terminated on 27 April 1993.

He raised an industrial dispute under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

During the proceedings, the Society agreed to reinstate him with continuity of service but without back wages, and the Labour Court, Patiala, passed a consent award dated 11 March 1996 accordingly.

The petitioner claimed that he submitted a joining report on 25 March 1996 but was not permitted to join.

The Society was subsequently merged into Markfed in 2008, with its assets, liabilities and employees being taken over by Markfed.

The petitioner first approached the authorities/Markfed in July 2017, more than 21 years after the award, seeking permission to join pursuant to the award.

Following an inquiry, the matter was placed before the Markfed Board, which rejected it by resolution dated 26 October 2020 on the ground that the claim was time-barred.

The petitioner challenged the resolution and sought enforcement of the award, reinstatement and consequential benefits under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

Whether the petitioner was entitled to a writ directing Markfed to permit him to join service and implement the Labour Court’s consent award dated 11 March 1996, despite approaching the authorities after an unexplained delay of more than two decades?

Whether the Markfed Board’s resolution dated 26 October 2020 rejecting the petitioner’s claim as time-barred was liable to be quashed for being illegal, arbitrary or violative of natural justice?

Whether a belated representation could revive a stale claim arising from the alleged denial of joining pursuant to the 1996 award?

The Court exercised its discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and applied the principle that writ relief may be refused where a petitioner approaches the Court after unreasonable delay and laches, even where no statutory limitation period applies to a writ petition.

It relied on Bhupal Singh Bhandari v. Union of India, 2026 LawFinder (SC) 456, and Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd. v. K. Thangappan, (2006) 4 SCC 322, for the rule that representations do not adequately explain delay or revive a stale claim.

It further relied on State of Uttaranchal v. Sri Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari, (2013) 12 SCC 179, holding that repeated representations do not keep a dead cause of action alive; C. Jacob v. Director of Geology and Mining, (2008) 10 SCC 115, holding that consideration or rejection of a stale representation does not create a fresh cause of action; and New Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan Singh, (2007) 9 SCC 278, holding that belated writ petitions may be rejected on delay and laches.

The Court also referred to Ram Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2022 (3) SCT 346, Prem Nath v. State of Punjab, 2018 (2) SCT 687, Union of India v. Chaman Rana, 2018 (5) SCC 798, Union of India v. C. Girija, 2019 (3) SCALE 527, and Senior Divisional Manager, LIC v. Shree Lal Meena, (2019) 4 SCC 479, reaffirming that stale claims cannot ordinarily be revived through belated representations.

The underlying industrial-dispute proceedings and award arose under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

The Court accepted that the 1996 Labour Court award directed reinstatement without back wages, but held that the petitioner failed to enforce the alleged right with reasonable promptitude.

Even on his own case, he was denied joining in 1996, yet he did not pursue any legal remedy or produce contemporaneous material showing continued diligence.

His first effective representation was made only in July 2017, after more than 21 years.

The Court also found that the petitioner had not substantiated his alleged joining report and had not shown that he asserted his claim at the time of the Society’s merger with Markfed in 2008, despite other employees taking steps to join or pursue their claims.

Applying the settled rule that a representation cannot revive a stale or dead cause of action, the Court held that the 2017 representation did not create a fresh cause of action.

The petitioner’s prolonged silence amounted to acquiescence and laches, and the discretionary writ jurisdiction could not be used to revive a claim that had remained dormant for over two decades.

Consequently, the challenge to the 2020 resolution could not succeed merely because the resolution formally rejected the belated claim as time-barred.

The 26 October 2020 resolution rejecting his claim on the ground of delay and laches was not interfered with.

The writ petition was dismissed as devoid of merit.