Unexplained five-year delay in filing an appeal constitutes insufficient cause for condonation.

The plaintiffs, including Lovekesh Talwar and Amita Talwar, instituted a suit for declaration and permanent injunction, asserting that various properties had been acquired from joint Hindu family funds and subsequently allotted to individual family members under an oral family settlement dated 01.02.2008, reduced into writing on 05.07.2008.

Defendants No.1 and 2 substantially admitted the family relationship, joint nature of the properties and the settlement, whereas defendants No.3 and 4 disputed the plaintiffs’ case and alleged that certain monetary obligations arose from the settlement.

The Trial Court framed several issues and dismissed the suit on 19.03.2013, principally because the plaintiffs failed to lead evidence. Although PW1 tendered his examination-in-chief, he did not appear for cross-examination, and the plaintiffs produced no further evidence despite repeated opportunities.

The plaintiffs filed an appeal on 30.04.2018, accompanied by an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of approximately five years’ delay.

The First Appellate Court dismissed the appeal on 02.05.2026, holding that no sufficient explanation had been furnished for the delay.

Whether the First Appellate Court rightly refused to condone the substantial delay in filing the first appeal under Section 5 of the Limitation Act?

Whether the appellants had demonstrated sufficient cause warranting interference by the High Court in regular second appeal?

The Court applied Section 5 of the Limitation Act, under which delay may be condoned only upon the applicant establishing “sufficient cause.”

It relied on H. Guruswamy v. A. Krishnaiah, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 54, holding that limitation is not a mere technicality; the length of delay and bona fides of the explanation must be examined, and courts should not begin with the merits of the underlying case.

The Court also relied on Thirunagalingam v. Lingeswaran, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1093, which reiterates that delay cannot be condoned as an act of generosity and that sufficient cause must first be established.

Further, Shivamma (Dead) by LRs v. Karnataka Housing Board, MANU/SC/1262/2025, was cited for the principle that limitation provisions promote finality and prevent lethargic or apathetic litigation.

The appellants’ explanation was that they delayed filing the appeal because the parties were attempting to implement or settle matters arising from the family settlement, and that defendant No.3 had subsequently resiled from it.

The Court found this explanation insufficient.

The plaintiffs had themselves instituted the original suit on the basis of the family settlement, yet failed to pursue it effectively: they did not complete their evidence, their witness did not submit to cross-examination, and the suit was dismissed in 2013.

They then remained inactive for approximately five years before filing the appeal.

The alleged meetings or efforts at compromise did not explain the delay on a day-to-day or otherwise reasonable basis and did not establish bona fides or sufficient cause.

Applying the Supreme Court’s limitation principles, the High Court held that substantial justice could not be invoked to disregard unexplained and prolonged inaction.

The First Appellate Court therefore rightly dismissed the appeal as not maintainable on limitation grounds, and no error warranting interference in regular second appeal was made out.

The regular second appeal was dismissed, and all pending applications were ordered to stand closed.