Unexplained injuries in mother-child deaths: Karnataka HC sets aside acquittal, orders fresh consideration under Section 302 IPC

Madhu married accused No.1, K. Nagaraja, on 29 November 1998. On 6 October 2004, Madhu and her approximately four-and-a-half-year-old son, Likhith Gowda, were found hanging in the matrimonial home.

The prosecution alleged dowry-related harassment and asserted that the deaths were homicidal rather than suicidal.

The post-mortem evidence described the cause of Madhu’s death as asphyxia due to suicidal hanging and the child’s death as homicidal throttling, while also noting ante-mortem injuries on both bodies.

The police filed a charge-sheet against accused Nos.1 to 3 for offences under Sections 498-A, 304-B and 306 read with Section 34 IPC and Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, but did not invoke Section 302 IPC.

The complainant thereafter filed a private complaint alleging defective investigation and murder. Cognizance was taken and the case was registered as S.C. No.107/2010.

The Sessions Court discharged the accused in respect of Section 302 IPC on 25 September 2012, while observing that the charge could be considered if sufficient evidence emerged during trial.

In the police case, S.C. No.131/2006, the Trial Court acquitted the accused of the charged offences on 28 October 2017, principally relying on alleged delay in lodging the complaint and the defence version concerning a prior panchayat.

The State challenged the acquittal in Crl.A. No.740/2018, and the complainant filed Crl.A. No.450/2018. The complainant also challenged the discharge order in Crl.R.P. No.83/2013.

The proceedings against accused No.2 abated owing to her death.

Whether the Trial Court erred in discharging the accused in S.C. No.107/2010 for the offence under Section 302 IPC.

Whether the Trial Court erred in failing to frame or consider a charge under Section 302 IPC in S.C. No.131/2006 despite the evidence and its earlier observation that such a charge could be considered during trial.

Whether the Trial Court improperly appreciated the evidence relating to the alleged delay, ante-mortem injuries, medical evidence and defects in investigation, resulting in a miscarriage of justice.

The Court applied Section 302 IPC concerning murder and Sections 498-A, 304-B and 306 IPC, along with Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

Section 210 Cr.P.C. requires a complaint case and a police-report case arising from the same offence to be tried together where the statutory conditions are satisfied.

Relying on Sankaran Moitra v. Sadhna Das, (2006) 4 SCC 58, and Dilawar Singh v. State of Delhi, (2007) 12 SCC 641, the Court held that Section 210 Cr.P.C. is intended to prevent parallel proceedings, harassment of the accused and inconsistent findings, and is mandatory subject to the requirement of failure of justice.

The Court further relied on Jasvinder Saini v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), (2013) 7 SCC 256, and Vijay Pal Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2014) 15 SCC 163, for the principle that a court may and should frame a Section 302 charge where direct or circumstantial evidence prima facie indicates murder, even if the police have not included that offence in the charge-sheet; Section 304-B may be treated as an alternative where appropriate.

The Court also applied the principles that defective investigation does not automatically justify acquittal, and that the Trial Judge has an affirmative duty to ascertain the truth by actively examining the evidence under Section 165 of the Evidence Act, as recognised in State of Rajasthan v. Ani, (1997) 6 SCC 162, Bablu Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2015) 8 SCC 787, and Dinesh Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2023) 20 SCC 49.

The Court relied on medical-law precedents including Mulakh Raj v. Satish Kumar, (1992) 3 SCC 43, Mandhari v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2002) 4 SCC 308, Rajasthan v. Ramesh, (2015) 17 SCC 673, and Shivaji Chintappa Patil v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 5 SCC 626, for distinguishing suicidal hanging from strangulation or homicidal throttling.

The Court held that the private complaint specifically alleged murder and relied on material requiring examination under Section 302 IPC, including ante-mortem injuries on Madhu and the child, the child’s reported homicidal throttling, inconsistencies between the inquest and post-mortem reports, and the disputed ligature-mark characteristics.

The Sessions Court erred by discharging the accused instead of applying Section 210(2) Cr.P.C. and trying the complaint case together with the police-report case, since both arose from the same incident and involved the same accused.

The Court further found that the Trial Court’s reliance on delay was unjustified.

The complainant’s evidence was that he learned of the deaths during the night, reached the matrimonial home the following morning and lodged the complaint at 10:15 a.m.; the contrary evidence consisted mainly of a stray admission by one witness and was not supported by effective cross-examination or reliable defence evidence.

The Court considered the medical inconsistencies material: the inquest referred to injuries on Madhu’s chest and near her ear, the post-mortem report recorded facial injuries and an oblique ligature mark, the photographs appeared to show a horizontal mark, and the child’s death was attributed to throttling.

These matters required further medical and forensic clarification rather than acquittal without consideration of Section 302 IPC.

The Trial Court also failed to exercise its duty to actively examine the doctors and Investigating Officer and, if necessary, obtain an opinion from a Medical Board or forensic expert.

It allowed Crl.A. Nos.740/2018 and 450/2018, set aside the judgment of acquittal dated 28 October 2017, and remanded the matter for the limited purpose of framing a charge under Section 302 IPC and recording a definite finding after reconsidering the relevant medical, forensic and investigative evidence; the findings concerning the other offences were not to be reopened.

The accused and the State were directed to appear before the Trial Court on 17 September 2026, and the Trial Court was directed to conclude the proceedings within four months on a day-to-day basis.

The High Court clarified that its observations were not to prejudice the Trial Court’s decision on the merits.

It also directed the police and Health Department authorities to sensitise Investigating Officers and doctors regarding investigative and post-mortem deficiencies, and directed consideration of disciplinary action for proven dereliction of duty.