Unproved breath-analyser reports cannot sustain departmental dismissal without examining the testing doctor.

The petitioner, a Police Constable (Driver) in the Bhagalpur Police Force, was allegedly found creating a nuisance in an intoxicated condition in the police barracks on 25 January 2020.

He was medically examined along with another constable, and an FIR was registered under Section 37(b)(C) of the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act, 2016.

A departmental proceeding was initiated on allegations of consuming liquor, creating nuisance, diminishing the image of the police force, and disobedience.

The Senior Superintendent of Police dismissed the petitioner from service on 21 July 2020; his departmental appeal and memorial were subsequently rejected.

Whether the departmental finding of guilt could be sustained when the principal evidence—the breath-analyser/medical report and FIR—was not proved through examination of their respective authors, and no witness directly established consumption of alcohol?

Whether the inquiry was vitiated because the Inquiry Officer effectively assumed the role of the Presenting Officer?

Whether the dismissal order was legally sustainable when it failed to consider the petitioner’s defence and did not provide adequate reasons?

Whether the dismissal, appellate order, and memorial order were liable to be quashed under the High Court’s power of judicial review under Article 226?

The Court applied the principle that judicial review under Article 226 does not ordinarily permit re-appreciation of evidence, but interference is justified where a disciplinary finding is based on no evidence, is perverse, or could not have been reached by a reasonable person.

Relying on Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank, (2009) 2 SCC 570, the Court held that mere production or tendering of a document does not prove its contents and that investigative materials cannot, by themselves, constitute proof in a departmental proceeding.

Bachubhai Hassanalli Karyani v. State of Maharashtra, (1971) 3 SCC 930, was relied upon for the principle that smell of alcohol, unsteady gait, or slurred speech, by themselves, do not conclusively establish alcohol consumption.

The requirement of procedural fairness and separation between the Inquiry Officer and Presenting Officer was supported by State of U.P. v. Saroj Kumar Sinha, (2010) 2 SCC 772, and Panchanan Kumar v. Bihar State Electricity Board, (1996) 1 PLJR 401.

The Court found that the departmental case substantially depended on the FIR and the breath-analyser/medical report.

However, the FIR’s author and the doctor who conducted the medical examination were not examined, and therefore the contents of those documents were not proved through admissible oral evidence.

The departmental witnesses merely stated that alcohol-like smell emanated from the petitioner and that he was taken for testing; none had witnessed him consuming liquor.

In the absence of a proved medical report, blood or urine test, or direct testimony of consumption, the finding of guilt was based on suspicion and unproved documents rather than legally sufficient evidence.

The Court additionally held that the Inquiry Officer had effectively taken over the Presenting Officer’s role, undermining the fairness of the inquiry.

The disciplinary authority’s dismissal order was also non-speaking because it did not meaningfully address the petitioner’s objections regarding the testing procedure and evidentiary deficiencies; the appellate and memorial authorities likewise failed to independently consider those grounds.

The dismissal order dated 21 July 2020, the appellate order dated 4 February 2021, and the memorial order passed by the Director General of Police were quashed and set aside.

The petitioner was held entitled to consequential benefits in accordance with the principles stated in Deepali Gundu Surwase.

The writ petition was allowed, with the parties directed to bear their own costs.