Unregistered document’s admissibility cannot be used to reject a plaint before trial, Supreme Court rules

The appellants-plaintiffs leased land to the respondents-defendants under a registered lease deed dated 17.10.2011 for 33 years, at a monthly rent of ₹92,550 with a 7% annual increase.

A supplementary lease deed dated 15.02.2013 was subsequently executed to modify certain terms, including the rent payable; the plaintiffs asserted that it was executed in continuation of the registered lease and did not require registration.

Alleging default in payment of rent under the modified terms, the plaintiffs issued a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and filed a suit for eviction and arrears of rent.

The defendants sought rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, contending that the unregistered supplementary lease deed was inadmissible under Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908, and that the plaint therefore disclosed no cause of action and was barred by law.

The trial court rejected the application, but the Patna High Court set aside that order and remanded the matter for reconsideration.

Whether the alleged inadmissibility of the unregistered supplementary lease deed could be considered as a ground for rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(a) or (d) CPC before commencement of trial.

Whether, on a meaningful reading of the plaint and the documents filed with it, the plaint disclosed a cause of action or was barred by law under Order VII Rule 11(a) or (d) CPC.

Whether the question of registration and admissibility of the supplementary lease deed was required to be adjudicated during trial, including in light of the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908.

The Court applied Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) CPC, under which a plaint may be rejected only where, on reading the plaint as a whole, it does not disclose a cause of action or the suit appears from the plaint to be barred by law.

At this stage, the plaint averments and documents filed with the plaint are material, while the defendant’s defence is irrelevant.

The Court relied on P.V. Guru Raj Reddy v. P. Neeradha Reddy, 2015 INSC 113, for the principle that rejection of a plaint is a drastic threshold remedy and that disputed matters ordinarily require trial.

Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908 restricts the use of an unregistered document required to be registered, but its proviso permits such a document to be received as evidence of a collateral transaction not required to be effected by a registered instrument.

The Court further distinguished authorities concerning admissibility at trial, including M/s K.B. Saha & Sons Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s Development Consultant Ltd., 2008 INSC 639, and held that admissibility cannot ordinarily be conclusively determined while considering an application under Order VII Rule 11.

The plaint specifically pleaded the existence of the registered lease, execution of the supplementary lease deed, modification of the lease terms, default in payment of rent, termination of the tenancy, and the consequent entitlement to eviction and arrears.

These averments, if accepted as true—as required at the Order VII Rule 11 stage—disclosed a prima facie cause of action.

The defendants’ contention that the supplementary lease deed required registration constituted a defence and raised a disputed question concerning the document’s legal effect and admissibility.

The plaintiffs had expressly pleaded that the document merely modified the earlier lease and did not require registration.

Determining whether the document was registrable, whether it could be proved, or whether it could be relied upon for a collateral transaction required evidence and could not be decided conclusively before trial.

Consequently, the High Court erred by recording a premature finding of inadmissibility and directing reconsideration of the rejection application on that basis.

The plaint disclosed a cause of action and was not, on its face, barred by law.

The High Court’s order dated 17.12.2024 was set aside, the defendants’ application under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) was rejected, and the trial court was directed to proceed with the suit on its merits in accordance with law.

The Court clarified that it had not decided the ultimate admissibility or legal effect of the supplementary lease deed, which was left open for determination at trial.