01Facts
The applicants, Group 'C' and 'D' employees absorbed in the Indian Council of Forestry Research & Education (ICFRE) with effect from 01.04.1993, seek fixation of pay in the 5th CPC scale of Rs. 6,500–10,500 with effect from 01.01.1996, together with two additional increments under Clause 5 of ICFRE Circular dated 08.09.1995.
¶ 2The applicants challenge ICFRE communications dated 20.03.2018, 07.07.2025 and 14.07.2025, and seek consequential revision of pension and arrears.
¶ 1, 2, 5The OA is delayed by 2100 days, and the applicants filed the MA seeking condonation.
¶ 3The applicants explain the delay by claiming that they continuously pursued their grievances with the respondent department, then engaged counsel and filed the OA late.
¶ 5.1–5.2, 9.1The respondents, particularly Respondent No. 4, opposed the MA. They submitted that the limitation period expired on 07.01.2026 and that the MA is silent on the period before that date and after it.
¶ 6, 6.2, 6.5No dates, particulars or copies of the alleged representations were disclosed.
¶ 6.402Issues
i.1. Whether the applicants have shown sufficient cause under Section 21(3) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, read with the principles of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, for condoning the delay of 2100 days in filing the OA.
¶ 9ii.2. Whether the pursuit of departmental representations, the recurring nature of the financial claim, and the belated engagement of counsel constitute sufficient cause for such delay.
¶ 14, 16, 1703Law Applied
Sections 19, 20 and 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 require that an application be filed within one year of the final order or of the expiry of the six-month period after a representation, and Section 21(3) empowers the Tribunal to admit a belated application only on the applicant's showing of sufficient cause.
¶ 10.1, quoting All India Civil Accounts Employees Association, OA No. 2532/2021Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 supplies the standard of "sufficient cause".
¶ 10.1The bona fides of the explanation must be examined before the merits, as laid down in H. Guruswamy v. A. Krishnaiah (2025).
¶ 6.1, 13The cause preventing timely filing must arise within the limitation period and later events cannot justify its expiry, as held in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary (2024).
¶ 6.2, 15Negligence, want of bona fides or inaction is not sufficient cause, as held in Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer (2013) and Ajay Dabra v. Pyare Ram (2023).
¶ 6.6The conduct of the party is relevant and a liberal approach cannot override the other party's interest, as held in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy (2013).
¶ 6.9, 17Administrative lethargy cannot constitute sufficient cause and condonation is not a matter of right, as held in Shivamma (Dead) by LRs v. Karnataka Housing Board (2025 INSC 1104).
¶ 11, 11.1, 32Repeated unsuccessful representations do not extend limitation, as held in S.S. Rathore v. State of M.P. (AIR 1990 SC 10).
¶ 10.2The Tribunal must first decide whether an application is within limitation, as required in D.C.S. Negi v. Union of India (2018) 16 SCC 721.
¶ 10.1, quoting D.C.S. NegiProvisions in the judgment · 5 · Linked ones open on LawLens
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 Section 19Section 20Section 21
Limitation Act, 1963 Section 5
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 Section 100
04Reasoning
The Tribunal first asked whether the applicants had explained the delay, not whether their claim had merit.
¶ 13, 9The applicants' explanation of continuous representations failed because the MA gave no dates, correspondence or assurances from the department. A bare assertion of pursuing departmental remedies cannot establish sufficient cause for the entire period.
¶ 14The explanation also failed to identify any event or circumstance arising within the limitation period (ending 07.01.2026) that prevented filing. The subsequent engagement of counsel cannot cure the absence of an explanation for the earlier period.
¶ 15, 16The applicants gave no date for approaching counsel and no account of the time taken to prepare the OA.
¶ 16The recurring financial character of the claim does not substitute for an explanation of delay.
¶ 17Applying Esha Bhattacharjee, substantial justice cannot be advanced by disregarding the statutory period where the party has not shown reasonable diligence. The explanation was vague and insufficient to account for a delay of 2100 days.
¶ 18The Tribunal did not reach the merits of the pay fixation or pension claims.
¶ 1305Holding
The applicants have not shown sufficient cause for the 2100-day delay.
¶ 19, 20The MA for condonation of delay is dismissed. Consequently, the OA is dismissed as barred by limitation, without adjudication on the merits of the pay fixation, increment, pension or arrears claims.
¶ 19, 20Original Court PDF
Kaloo SinghvsCLIMATE CHANGE
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