Whether decades-late summary eviction under tenancy law can be challenged for unreasonable delay referred to larger bench by Bombay High Court

The dispute concerns land at Indapur. The petitioners’ predecessor, Shankar Salunkhe, was found to be in possession in earlier revenue proceedings; the High Court, in a 1981 proceeding concerning revenue entries, did not interfere with that finding and observed that the claimants could pursue a civil suit to establish title.

In 2013, the respondents applied under Section 84(c) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, alleging that the petitioners were in unauthorised possession. The Sub-Divisional Officer rejected the application as time-barred, but the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal allowed the respondents’ revision and directed delivery of possession.

The petitioners challenged the Tribunal’s order, relying on the delay, their possession, and the earlier proceedings.

1. Whether, despite the absence of an express limitation period in Section 84(c), the Collector must consider whether the power was exercised within a reasonable period, without importing a fixed limitation period.

2. Whether Ganesh and Another v. Khushalrao and Others excludes consideration of delay, laches, prejudice and settled rights when exercising the analogous power under Section 84(c), and whether any such proposition requires reconsideration.

3. Whether Section 84(c) permits summary eviction merely because an occupant lacks established title, or requires the Collector first to examine any claimed statutory right under the Act and the availability of another statutory remedy.

4. Whether, after possession has continued for decades and earlier proceedings have taken note of it, the Collector may exercise Section 84(c) without considering the intervening proceedings, the parties’ conduct, delay, prejudice and finality in settled possession.

Section 84 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 authorises summary eviction in specified circumstances, including where a person is not entitled to use and occupy land under the Act and the Act provides no other eviction remedy; the Collector must therefore establish the statutory conditions before ordering eviction.

The Court distinguished a statutory limitation bar from scrutiny of delay: absence of a fixed limitation period does not permit the Court to insert one, but may leave open consideration of whether the statutory power was exercised unreasonably in the circumstances.

It referred to State of Punjab v. Bhatinda District Coop. Milk Producers Union Ltd., Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya Coolie Sangham v. K. Suresh Reddy, Situ Sahu v. State of Jharkhand and M/s North Eastern Chemicals Industries (P) Ltd. v. M/s Ashok Paper Mill (Assam) Ltd. on reasonable time, delay and prejudice where no limitation period is prescribed.

It also considered the Division Bench ruling in Ganesh and Another v. Khushalrao and Others, which held that no limitation period applies under Section 98 of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 and that a reasonable-time limitation cannot be read into that section.

The Court did not finally determine how those principles govern Section 84(c); it referred that question, together with the scope of the Collector’s jurisdiction, to a larger Bench.

The Court held that Section 84(c) contains jurisdictional conditions: the Collector must determine whether the occupant is unauthorised and whether the person has a right or protection under the Tenancy Act, or another statutory remedy applies.

It rejected both the proposition that a fixed three-year period could be imposed and the proposition that delay must invariably be ignored.

It reasoned that Ganesh was binding as to the impermissibility of importing a fixed limitation period, but its effect on consideration of unreasonable delay, prejudice and settled rights required authoritative clarification in light of the Supreme Court authorities discussed.

Because the case involved decades of possession and prior proceedings, the Court considered the issue substantial but left the merits—including the parties’ competing rights and the effect of the earlier High Court order—open.