Wildlife Act protection for Tokay geckos applies prospectively from Gazette publication.

On 28 November 2013, police allegedly recovered a live Tokay Gecko from a vehicle occupied by the petitioners and seized it.

After investigation, charges were framed against them under Section 51 of the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 (“the Act”).

The petitioners later sought alteration or modification of the charge under Section 216 CrPC, arguing that the Tokay Gecko was added to Schedule IV of the Act by a notification published in the Official Gazette on 12 December 2013—after the alleged incident—and that the notification could not operate retrospectively.

The Trial Court rejected that application on 1 June 2018.

The petitioners challenged both the charge-framing order and the order rejecting their application.

Whether the notification adding the Tokay Gecko to Schedule IV could apply to alleged conduct occurring before its publication in the Official Gazette

Whether the Trial Court’s rejection of the petitioners’ application for alteration or modification of the charge should be set aside and reconsidered

Section 51 of the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 provides penalties for offences under the Act; the Court considered the notification adding the Tokay Gecko to Schedule IV, published in the Official Gazette on 12 December 2013.

The Court held that a statutory notification becomes enforceable upon publication in the Official Gazette and, absent authority in the parent statute, cannot impose retrospective criminal liability.

It further stated that Section 61 of the Act does not empower the Central Government to amend the Schedules with retrospective criminal effect.

The petitioners invoked Section 216(1), (3) and (4) CrPC in seeking alteration or modification of the charge.

The alleged recovery occurred on 28 November 2013, before the notification was published on 12 December 2013.

The Special Public Prosecutor did not dispute the notification’s publication date or its non-retrospective effect.

Applying the rule against retrospective criminal liability, the Court reasoned that the alleged conduct could not attract the Act’s penalties on the basis of a later-published notification.

It therefore found that the Trial Court’s rejection of the petition to alter or modify the charge could not stand, while leaving the application for fresh consideration by the Trial Court.

The revision petition was disposed of, and the Trial Court’s original charge-framing order was not expressly set aside.