Writ jurisdiction is unavailable for purely contractual termination disputes with private unaided educational institutions absent a public-law element.

The petitioner challenged her termination from service by a privately managed, unaided educational institution/trust.

The respondents raised a preliminary objection that the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution was not maintainable because the dispute arose from a purely private employer–employee relationship.

The petitioner relied on Andi Mukta Sadguru Shri Muktaji Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R. Rudani , VST Industries Ltd. v. VST Industries Workers’ Union , Manoj Kumar, Principal (Terminated) v. State of U.P. , and the Full Bench decision in Uttam Chand Rawat v. State of U.P. to contend that a private educational institution performing public functions could be subjected to writ jurisdiction.

The respondents argued that the institution was wholly unaided, received no governmental grant, was not shown to be established or recognised under a statute, and that the petitioner’s service conditions were not governed by statutory provisions.

Whether a writ petition under Article 226 is maintainable against a private, unaided educational institution or trust in respect of the termination of an employee?

Whether the petitioner’s challenge to termination involved an enforceable statutory right or public-law obligation, or was merely a private contractual service dispute?

Article 226 permits issuance of a writ, including mandamus, against a private body where it discharges a public duty or performs a public function and the obligation sought to be enforced has a public-law character, as recognised in Andi Mukta Sadguru Shri Muktaji Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R. Rudani .

Under the Full Bench decision in Uttam Chand Rawat v. State of U.P. , two conditions must be satisfied: the respondent must discharge a public function or duty, and the impugned action must fall within the domain of public law rather than private law.

St. Mary’s Education Society v. Rajendra Prasad Bhargava holds that employees of private educational institutions ordinarily cannot invoke Article 226 regarding service matters not governed by statutory provisions, and that individual breaches of ordinary service contracts lack a public element.

The same principle was reiterated in Army Welfare Education Society v. Sunil Kumar Sharma and Dilip Kumar Pandey v. Union of India , particularly in relation to purely private service disputes involving unaided educational institutions.

The Court distinguished between the amenability of a private institution to writ jurisdiction in an appropriate case and the maintainability of a particular claim against it.

Although imparting education may constitute a public or socially significant function, the present institution was a private and unaided trust, was not shown to be an instrumentality of the State, received no governmental aid, and was not demonstrated to be subject to statutory service conditions.

The impugned action concerned only the termination of the petitioner’s individual employment.

Since no statutory right was shown to have been violated and no public-law duty was shown to have been breached, the dispute remained within the private-law domain.

The principles in Andi Mukta and the other authorities relied upon by the petitioner therefore did not convert this contractual service dispute into a public-law controversy.

The writ petition was accordingly dismissed on the ground of maintainability alone, without adjudicating the merits of the termination.