Writ jurisdiction should not be exercised against PMLA attachment orders absent manifest jurisdictional error.

The petitioners challenged, under Article 226 of the Constitution, a Provisional Attachment Order dated 24 February 2026 issued by the Directorate of Enforcement (“ED”) under Section 5(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (“PMLA”), and the connected press release dated 2 March 2026.

The ED’s investigation arose from three FIRs concerning alleged illegal betting, cheating, and related activities connected with the online betting platform 1xBet; an ECIR was recorded on 23 May 2025.

Petitioner No. 1 was the founder and CEO of petitioner No. 2, Parthtech Developers LLP, a digital publisher and advertising-service provider alleged to have displayed advertisements promoting 1xBet through advertising intermediaries.

The ED alleged that petitioner No. 2 received approximately ₹79.23 crore from Bwise Media AG between FY 2021–22 and FY 2024–25, of which approximately ₹18.08 crore was attributable to 1xBet advertisements, including approximately ₹5.18 crore relating to advertisements targeted at Indian users.

The PAO identified ₹18,10,90,052.45 as proceeds of crime and alleged that the funds were used to purchase immovable properties and create fixed deposits.

The ED consequently attached a fixed deposit of ₹1,10,90,052.45 and three immovable properties in Gurugram valued at approximately ₹17 crore, standing in the name of petitioner No. 1.

The ED contended that the petitioners had an efficacious and time-bound statutory remedy before the Adjudicating Authority, followed by appeals under Sections 26 and 42 of the PMLA.

The petitioners argued that the writ petition involved a fundamental jurisdictional issue because the alleged betting and advertising activities were not offences under Indian law during the relevant period, and the Promotion and Regulation of Online Gaming Act, 2025 (“PROGA”) was enacted only on 28 August 2025 and brought into force on 1 June 2026.

Whether the High Court should exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 to examine a PAO issued under Section 5(1) of the PMLA despite the availability of statutory remedies before the Adjudicating Authority and appellate forums?

Whether the absence of a separately registered criminal case concerning a scheduled offence, before issuance of the PAO, rendered the ED’s exercise of power under Section 5(1) ex facie without jurisdiction?

Whether the ED’s alleged inclusion of advertising revenues relating to users outside India and the attachment of assets allegedly disproportionate to the Indian-related proceeds constituted a jurisdictional defect warranting writ intervention?

The Court applied the statutory scheme of the PMLA, under which provisional attachment may be made under Section 5(1), followed by proceedings before the Adjudicating Authority under Sections 5(3) and 5(5), with appellate remedies under Sections 26 and 42.

Section 66(2) of the PMLA requires the ED to share information with the concerned agency where the material indicates contravention of another law.

The Court relied on Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, which holds that registration of an FIR concerning a scheduled offence is not a prerequisite to provisional attachment under Section 5; however, information must be forwarded to the jurisdictional police under Section 66(2) where the scheduled offence has not already been registered.

Applying the principles in Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Popcorn Entertainment v. City Industrial Development Corpn., and Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. v. ETOCAA, the Court recognised that alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to Article 226 jurisdiction, particularly in cases of fundamental jurisdictional error.

However, following RBL Bank Ltd. v. Enforcement Directorate, Gold Croft Properties (P) Ltd. v. Enforcement Directorate, and Gautam Khaitan v. Union of India, the Court held that writ jurisdiction in challenges to PAOs must be exercised sparingly and only where there is mala fide action, patent arbitrariness, or manifest lack of jurisdiction.

The Court held that the petitioners had not demonstrated a manifest lack of jurisdiction.

The PAO referred to three FIRs, including allegations under Section 420 IPC, corresponding to Section 318(4) of the BNS, which is a scheduled offence under the PMLA.

The PAO’s reference to proceeds arising from “illegal betting,” without separately using the expression “cheating,” was not determinative at the writ stage because the document had to be read holistically.

Further, under Vijay Madanlal Choudhary, a prior FIR was not indispensable for provisional attachment under Section 5.

The ED had contemporaneously forwarded information to the Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad, under Section 66(2), identifying prima facie offences under the BNS and the IT Act.

The fact that the police had not yet registered an FIR did not invalidate the PAO.

The challenge concerning advertisements directed at users in Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka was treated as relating to the quantification of proceeds of crime rather than to the ED’s jurisdiction.

The competing assertions regarding the location of the advertisements, servers, and users raised disputed questions of fact, which were more appropriately examinable in the statutory PMLA proceedings.

The Court also noted that petitioner No. 2 had already invoked the statutory appellate remedy under Section 26 in connected proceedings, where the existence of a scheduled offence had also been questioned.

This reinforced the appropriateness of requiring the petitioners to pursue the statutory process rather than maintain parallel writ proceedings.

It held that the absence of a prior FIR did not, by itself, invalidate the PAO, particularly since the ED had forwarded relevant information under Section 66(2) of the PMLA.

The petition, along with the pending applications, was dismissed, while all rights and contentions were expressly left open for consideration before the Adjudicating Authority and in subsequent proceedings under the PMLA.