Writ petitions barred by delay and laches cannot be revived by subsequent representations or policy changes.

The petitioner registered under the DDA’s NPRS 1979 Scheme for allotment of an LIG flat on 1 July 1980.

The DDA allegedly issued a demand-cum-allotment letter, but it was returned undelivered; the petitioner claimed that it was not subsequently served at her occupational address.

She received a show-cause notice dated 20 September 1993 proposing cancellation of the allotment and replied that she had not received the demand letter, requesting a copy to enable payment.

The petitioner continued to seek the demand letter and possession, and relied upon a DDA policy dated 25 February 2005 concerning cases where demand letters were sent to incorrect addresses or allotment priority was missed.

She filed the writ petition in 2012, seeking allotment of an LIG flat at the old cost, issuance of the demand letter, and permission to pay under the hire-purchase mode.

Whether the writ petition under Article 226 was liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches, despite the petitioner’s assertion that the demand-cum-allotment letter had not been served.

Whether the petitioner’s visits to the DDA office, the DDA’s 2005 policy, and her alleged medical incapacity furnished a fresh or sufficient cause of action explaining the delay in approaching the writ court.

Whether the petitioner was entitled to allotment of an LIG flat at the old cost and to refund of the amount deposited with the DDA.

The Court exercised its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, applying the doctrine of delay and laches. Although no statutory limitation period is prescribed for a writ petition, a writ court may decline relief where the petitioner approaches after an unreasonable delay, particularly when the delay may prejudice settled or crystallised rights; where the delay exceeds the limitation period applicable to an analogous civil claim, it may ordinarily be treated as unreasonable.

The Court relied on Banda Development Authority v. Moti Lal Agarwal, (2011) 5 SCC 394.

It also relied on Mrinmoy Maity v. Chhanda Koley, (2024) 15 SCC 215, which holds that delay defeats equity, that a belated litigant who has slept over his rights should ordinarily not receive extraordinary writ relief, and that subsequent representations or memorials cannot revive a dead cause of action; however, delay may be excused where it is satisfactorily explained on the facts.

The Court further applied the principle that a writ petition may be dismissed solely on the ground of unexplained delay and laches.

The Court held that the petitioner knew by 1994 that a demand-cum-allotment letter had been issued in her favour, even if she disputed its actual receipt.

On that basis, she was required to challenge the alleged non-service or seek appropriate relief within a reasonable period. Her continued visits to the DDA office did not suspend or renew the cause of action, and the 2005 policy could not revive a claim that had already become stale.

The petitioner’s alleged surgeries also did not constitute a satisfactory explanation because she supplied no particulars regarding their dates, nature, or duration.

The Court therefore concluded that the petitioner had slept over her rights and that the writ petition, filed in 2012 after prolonged inaction, was barred by delay and laches.

However, upon the petitioner’s request and the DDA’s statement that the deposited amount would be returned, the Court directed that the refund be processed in accordance with the applicable rules and regulations, subject to submission of the requisite documents.