Writ review of arbitral procedural orders is confined to exceptional circumstances.

The petitioner and Respondent No. 1 entered into dealership agreements concerning agricultural equipment, including an agreement dated 21 April 2022.

The petitioner alleged that the respondents breached that agreement, leading to arbitration.

In the arbitration, the petitioner sought, under Section 27 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“A&C Act”), to summon witnesses and was also seeking examination of a handwriting expert.

The Sole Arbitrator dismissed the application and closed the petitioner’s evidence, reasoning that the 2022 agreement was the only agreement on record and that the petitioner could not introduce a new defence that it was unsigned or summon the respondent’s officers or documents to prove its case.

The petitioner challenged that order under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, asserting that the witnesses were necessary to prove additional documents and that no alternative remedy was available under the A&C Act.

1. Whether the High Court should entertain a writ petition challenging an arbitral tribunal’s procedural order refusing to summon witnesses and closing a party’s evidence.

2. Whether the petitioner’s grievance could instead be raised in a challenge under Section 34 of the A&C Act after the arbitral award was made.

Under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the High Court’s power to review arbitral tribunal orders is not excluded, but its exercise is exceptionally narrow and requires utmost judicial restraint. Bhaven Construction v. Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam Ltd., (2022) 1 SCC 75, recognises that intervention may be warranted in exceptional circumstances, including where a party is left remediless under the statute or clear bad faith is shown.

Section 5 of the A&C Act limits judicial intervention to circumstances contemplated by the Act; Section 37 identifies appealable orders, while Section 34 provides a route to challenge an arbitral award. Procedural decisions concerning the conduct of arbitration ordinarily fall within the tribunal’s domain and discretion.

The impugned order concerned the conduct of the arbitration: the tribunal had refused the requested summons and closed the petitioner’s evidence. The Court held that such procedural decisions lay within the tribunal’s domain and did not, on the circumstances presented, justify exceptional constitutional intervention.

The petitioner could challenge the consequences of the order in proceedings under Section 34 after the award, so the Court was not persuaded that the petitioner was left without a statutory remedy. Intervening before the award, the Court reasoned, risked frustrating the A&C Act’s objective of efficient dispute resolution and minimal judicial intervention.

The petition was dismissed, and the pending applications were disposed of.