Yamuna Fishing Lease: Allahabad HC Says Eligible Societies From Both Banks May Participate, With Priority Rules Governing Allotment

Petitioner No. 1 is a fishermen cooperative society registered in Auraiya, whose members reside on the Auraiya bank of Part I of the Yamuna.

For the 2026–27 settlement of fishing rights over the Kanjausa–Himmatpur stretch, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Madhogarh, Jalaun, advertised an auction.

The Assistant Director of Fisheries, Jalaun, informed the petitioners that Jalaun societies would be considered first and an Auraiya society only if no Jalaun society applied or qualified.

The petitioners challenged that restriction, arguing that Explanation 3 to the Government Order dated 10 January 2019 rotates the authority conducting the settlement, not the eligibility of societies from either bank.

The Director of Fisheries subsequently stated on affidavit that eligible societies from both districts could participate simultaneously, subject to the prescribed priority.

The Government Order dated 10 January 2019 provides a territorial order of priority for eligible fishermen cooperative societies, progressing from the concerned village to the Nyaya Panchayat, Development Block, district and State, followed by the other specified categories; Explanation 1 addresses eligibility, Explanation 2 provides for settlement and an auction among societies in the eligibility list where more than one qualifies, and Explanation 3 rotates the District Magistrate responsible for conducting the settlement where a river forms a district boundary.

In Matsya Jivi Sahkari Samiti Limited v. State of U.P., Writ-C No. 26978 of 2023, Neutral Citation No. 2024:AHC:6539-DB, the Division Bench upheld the Government Order and treated Explanation 3 as identifying the conducting District Magistrate.

Ram Kumar v. State of U.P., 2006 (24) LCD 59, and Matsyajivi Sahkari Samiti Ltd. v. State of U.P., 2018 (2) ADJ 431, recognise the rational, livelihood-oriented preference for fishermen societies and require its application according to the prescribed hierarchy.

The Court also relied on the principles concerning protective preferences and livelihood in Parvej Aktar v. Union of India, (1993) 2 SCC 221, and Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, (1985) 3 SCC 545.

Judicial review permits intervention where policy is unlawful or manifestly arbitrary, but does not allow the Court to substitute its preferred policy for the executive’s lawful choice.

The Court read Explanation 3 as rotating the conducting authority only: it neither makes societies on the opposite bank ineligible nor requires their consideration to await the exhaustion of societies from the conducting district.

The priority provisions remain controlling; simultaneous participation does not place all societies in the same rank, but requires the authority to verify eligibility and apply the prescribed categories before allotment.

The Assistant Director’s two-stage process added a district-based threshold absent from the Government Order and converted rotation of administrative responsibility into rotation of eligibility.

That construction was inconsistent with the policy text and the joint-settlement understanding noted in the 2024 Division Bench judgment.

The Court therefore held that the Auraiya society could not be excluded solely because Jalaun’s authority was conducting the settlement, while leaving its eligibility and priority category for verification.

It quashed the Assistant Director’s communication insofar as it postponed consideration of Auraiya societies until Jalaun societies were exhausted, and directed that Petitioner No. 1 be permitted to participate subject to verification of its eligibility.

Because the auction had been made subject to the writ petition, the competent authority was directed to review any action already taken, after hearing any affected allottee, and pass consequential orders within six weeks of receiving the certified judgment.

The writ petition was allowed; no order as to costs.