01Facts
The landowning defendants agreed to sell properties said to comprise more than 300 acres at ₹16,250 per acre.
¶ 2–5The plaintiff paid ₹30,00,001 and alleged that a survey showed only 205.15 acres were available.
¶ 2–5He sought specific performance for that reduced extent; the trial court decreed the suit.
¶ 2–5The landowners appealed.
¶ 2–5During the appeal, the defendant companies were struck off and dissolved under Section 248(5) of the Companies Act, 2013.
¶ 15–18, 20–23, 36The High Court first considered whether the appeal could continue, then examined the plaintiff’s readiness and willingness, the alleged shortage, and the subsequent purchasers’ claims.
¶ 36, 8602Issues
i.1. Whether the appeal could continue despite the defendant companies’ striking off and dissolution.
¶ 36, 53–85ii.2. Whether time was the essence of the sale agreement.
¶ 86(ii), 89iii.3. Whether the plaintiff proved continuous readiness and willingness to perform the agreement, including by establishing and communicating the alleged reduced extent.
¶ 86(i), 90–99iv.4. Whether the plaintiff could seek specific performance for 205.15 acres rather than the larger extent described in the agreement.
¶ 86(iii), 100v.5. Whether the subsequent purchasers were bona fide purchasers for value without notice of the earlier agreement.
¶ 86(iv), 101–10303Law Applied
Under Sections 248 and 250 of the Companies Act, 2013, a company struck off under Section 248 generally ceases to operate as a company, but the cancellation does not apply for the purpose of realising amounts due or discharging its liabilities or obligations; the Court treated a contractual obligation arising from a sale agreement as within that exception.
¶ 50–77A challenge to the striking-off action must be pursued through the statutory remedy under Section 252.
¶ 50–77Under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, a plaintiff seeking specific performance must plead and prove continuous readiness and willingness; the court assesses this from the plaintiff’s conduct and the surrounding circumstances.
¶ 94.1–94.4Specific performance is discretionary under Section 20 as applicable to the suit.
¶ 94.1–94.4The Court also applied the principle that time is not ordinarily presumed to be of the essence in a contract for sale of immovable property, but the parties’ conduct and the requirement to perform within a reasonable time remain relevant.
¶ 89.9–89.14It considered the principles in N. Thirugnanam v. R. Jagan Mohan Rao, (1995) 5 SCC 115; Zarina Siddiqui v. A. Ramalingam, (2015) 1 SCC 705; Surinder Kaur v. Bahadur Singh, (2019) 8 SCC 575; and C.S. Venkatesh v. A.S.C. Murthy, (2020) 3 SCC 280.
¶ 94.1–94.4Provisions in the judgment · 60 · Linked ones open on LawLens
Companies Act, 2013 13 provisions
Section 7Section 8Section 9Section 10Section 12Section 245Section 248Section 249Section 250Section 251Section 252Section 455Section 506Transfer of Property Act, 1882 Section 40Section 55
Indian Contract Act, 1872 34 provisions
Section 37Section 38Section 39Section 40Section 41Section 42Section 43Section 44Section 45Section 46Section 47Section 48Section 49Section 50Section 51Section 52Section 53Section 54Section 55Section 56Section 57Section 58Section 59Section 60Section 61Section 62Section 63Section 64Section 65Section 66Section 67Section 73Section 74Section 75Specific Relief Act, 1963 Section 2Section 12Section 16Section 20Section 21Section 22Section 38Section 39
Indian Trust Act, 1882 Section 91
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 Section 96Section 100
04Reasoning
The Court held that the appeal could proceed because the dispute concerned the enforcement of a contractual obligation preserved by Section 250, notwithstanding the companies’ dissolution.
¶ 85It found that the landowners’ post-deadline conduct showed they had not treated the stipulated date as an inflexible deadline, so time was not the essence; however, the plaintiff still had to prove performance within a reasonable time.
¶ 89.5–89.15He did not do so: the alleged survey report (Ex. A6) lacked essential particulars and contained discrepancies, while the plaintiff’s notice, sent more than a year after the alleged survey, did not mention the survey, the claimed shortage, or readiness to buy the reduced extent.
¶ 91.1–93The evidence also failed to establish that he had communicated the alleged extent to the landowners or taken possession.
¶ 91.1–93The Court therefore found that continuous readiness and willingness had not been proved.
¶ 93It rejected the objection that specific performance for the reduced extent was impermissible under Section 12, because the agreement contemplated determination of the available extent after survey.
¶ 95–103Finally, it found no proof that the subsequent purchasers knew of the unregistered agreement; their title documents and revenue records supported their claim of purchase and possession.
¶ 95–10305Holding
The High Court held that the appeal could continue despite the defendant companies’ dissolution, but that the plaintiff had failed to establish continuous readiness and willingness to perform the agreement.
¶ 85, 93It also held that the subsequent purchasers were bona fide purchasers for value without notice.
¶ 103The appeal was allowed, the trial court’s decree for specific performance was set aside, and the suit was dismissed.
¶ 104No costs were awarded.
¶ 104Original Court PDF
M/S.AMARKANTAK ORCHARDSvsP.A.JOSEPH(died)
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