A credible rape victim’s testimony sustains conviction despite discrepancies and non-seizure of mobile evidence.

The appellant challenged the judgment dated 7 December 2024 of the Special Judge (POCSO), Dhemaji, convicting him under Section 376(1) IPC and sentencing him to 25 years’ rigorous imprisonment with a fine of ₹30,000, with two years’ rigorous imprisonment in default.

The prosecution alleged that on 19 April 2022, while the victim was returning from a Bihu function, the appellant forcibly took her to a jungle and raped her. The victim thereafter reached the house of PW-4, disclosed the incident, and was subsequently taken home by her mother, who lodged the FIR on 5 May 2022.

A village meeting followed the incident, where the appellant allegedly agreed to marry or maintain the victim; the victim stayed at the appellant’s house for approximately five days, after which the appellant married another woman and the victim returned to her parental home.

The victim identified the appellant before the Court and stated that he had forcibly dragged her into the jungle, gagged her, raped her, and taken her mobile phone.

Her statement under Section 164 CrPC also alleged forcible sexual intercourse and injuries.

The medical examination recorded that her hymen was not intact and that there was white discharge; the radiological examination estimated her age between 16 and 17 years.

The Trial Court, however, found her to be above 18 years of age at the time of occurrence and convicted the appellant under Section 376(1) IPC.

In appeal, the appellant argued mistaken identity, non-seizure of the parties’ mobile phones and messages, non-examination of the owner of the alleged place of occurrence, and consensual intercourse or false implication arising from his marriage to another woman.

The Court applied Section 376(1) IPC, under which sexual intercourse with a woman without her consent constitutes rape and attracts the prescribed punishment.

It held that a conviction may be based on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix where her evidence is reliable, consistent and inspires confidence; the victim of sexual assault is to be treated at least as an injured witness.

The Court also relied on the principle that the absence of the hymen is corroborative of sexual intercourse but, by itself, does not establish absence of consent; the question of consent must be determined from the entire evidence.

It referred to Wazir Khan v. State of Uttarakhand, (2023) 11 SCR 39, for the proposition that an accused’s failure to explain an incriminating circumstance under Section 313 CrPC may constitute an additional link in a chain of circumstantial evidence, while clarifying that the present case primarily rested on the victim’s direct testimony.

The Court further applied the principle that minor discrepancies which do not affect the core prosecution case do not warrant rejection of otherwise credible evidence.

The Court found that the victim consistently identified the appellant as the assailant, both when shown his photograph and in Court.

The appellant did not put to the victim that he was not the person who had assaulted her; instead, his cross-examination proceeded on the basis that sexual intercourse had occurred consensually, which the victim denied.

Her immediate disclosure to PW-4, her mud-covered condition, and the short interval between the alleged assault and her reaching PW-4’s house were treated as corroborative circumstances supporting her account.

The medical evidence corroborated the fact of sexual intercourse, while the victim’s testimony established that it was forcible and without consent.

The Court rejected the mistaken-identity argument because the victim had identified the appellant through the photograph shown to her and before the Court; the absence of the mobile phones or messages was not considered material to proof of the assault.

The non-examination of the person allegedly associated with the place of occurrence did not undermine the victim’s testimony.

The discrepancy between the FIR’s reference to a marriage and the witnesses’ reference to an agreement or promise to marry was held to be immaterial, as it did not affect the central allegation of rape.

The Court also noted that the appellant did not deny, during cross-examination or under Section 313 CrPC, the village meeting or the victim’s subsequent stay at his house, and his blanket denial did not displace the prosecution evidence.

The alleged motive of false implication arising from the appellant’s marriage to another woman was insufficient to erase the initial allegation of rape.

The appeal was dismissed insofar as the conviction was concerned.

However, considering the sentence imposed, the Court reduced the punishment from 25 years’ rigorous imprisonment to 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment, retaining the fine of ₹30,000; in default of payment, the appellant was directed to undergo six months’ rigorous imprisonment instead of two years.

The Trial Court’s judgment was modified only to that extent, and the Trial Court Record was directed to be returned.