A fresh disciplinary enquiry cannot be replaced by notices and consideration of replies.

The petitioners were engaged by BESCOM as Micro Feeder Franchisees, later redesignated as Grama Vidyut Prathinidhis, under memoranda of understanding.

Their services were terminated, and a coordinate Bench, by order dated 31 August 2020, quashed the termination orders and directed the respondents to hold disciplinary enquiries within eight weeks; if the petitioners were not found guilty, they were to be reinstated without consequential benefits.

The Division Bench dismissed BESCOM’s appeals and directed compliance with the Single Judge’s directions.

The respondents later issued notices, considered the petitioners’ replies and passed orders affirming the terminations.

The petitioners challenged those orders, contending that the directed enquiries had not been held.

1. Whether issuing notices, considering the petitioners’ replies and affirming the earlier termination orders amounted to the disciplinary enquiry directed in the earlier writ proceedings

2. Whether the impugned termination orders should be set aside and the matter remitted for disciplinary enquiries in accordance with the earlier directions

The Court applied the binding directions in the earlier writ proceedings, as affirmed by the Division Bench: the respondents were required to conduct disciplinary enquiries, and petitioners not found guilty were to be reinstated without consequential benefits.

A notice-and-reply procedure followed by reaffirmation of an earlier termination does not, by itself, satisfy a direction to conduct a disciplinary enquiry.

The Court also referred to the earlier order’s recognition of the principles of natural justice and Article 21 in the context of termination from livelihood, citing Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, (1985) 3 SCC 545.

The Court compared the procedure actually followed with the prior judicial directions.

Although notices were issued and replies considered, the respondents’ orders substantially reiterated the earlier terminations rather than conducting the fresh disciplinary enquiry required by the Court.

The Court therefore held that the prior directions had not been complied with and that the termination orders could not stand.

The impugned orders were set aside, and the matter was remitted to the respondents to conduct disciplinary enquiries in accordance with the directions in the earlier writ proceedings.

Given the protracted history, the respondents were directed to conclude the enquiries within three months of receiving a copy of the order.

The judgment identifies the challenged orders as dated 2 May 2025, while the operative order states 2 May 2026.