A society’s executive committee does not become defunct merely upon expiry of its term.

The plaintiffs sought recovery of alleged defalcated funds and declarations concerning the authority to represent Panskura Vidyasagar Social Welfare Society. They also sought an ad-interim injunction restraining respondents 6–8 from operating the Society’s bank accounts or holding themselves out as its office bearers.

The appellants alleged that those respondents had been removed from their Society posts at a meeting on 23 February 2026 and later relied on a communication allegedly bearing the President’s forged signature to assert authority; the respondents disputed the communication and claimed to be the Society’s valid functionaries.

The Trial Court, despite finding a prima facie case, directed both sides to maintain status quo regarding transactions in the Society’s bank accounts. The plaintiffs appealed.

Whether the appellants had established a sufficient prima facie basis for an ad-interim injunction restraining respondents 6–8 from holding themselves out as Society office bearers and operating its bank accounts.

Whether the Trial Court’s status quo order should be set aside because it was inconsistent with its findings and exceeded the relief sought.

Section 19 of the West Bengal Societies Registration Act, 1961 provides that a Society may sue or be sued in the name of its President, Secretary, or an office bearer authorised by the governing body.

The Court also applied the Society’s regulations: the President is to preside over Executive Committee meetings, and Regulation 13 provides for operation of the Society’s bank accounts by the President, Secretary, and Treasurer, any of them jointly.

At the ad-interim stage, the Court considers the plaint, injunction application, and supporting documents; a prima facie case and the risk that delay may defeat the purpose of relief support an injunction.

The Court further stated that expiry of an Executive Committee’s tenure does not, by itself, render the Committee defunct where no new body has been elected through a valid process, as that could leave the Society without functioning management.

The Court found that the plaint identified the Society’s Secretary as plaintiff no. 1 and Payel Sahoo as plaintiff no. 2, and that the pleadings and supporting meeting minutes prima facie showed her appointment as Secretary in February 2026, addressing the respondents’ objection under Section 19.

The materials also prima facie indicated that respondents 6–8 had been removed before their claimed election in May 2026; the Court therefore found they lacked locus standi to convene the later meeting. The May resolution’s description of respondent no. 6 as President was also inconsistent with the then-existing presidency of Amiya Kumar Sahoo.

In light of the Society’s regulations and the appellants’ supporting materials, the Court found a strong prima facie case for the requested restraint.

The Trial Court’s blanket status quo order was contradictory to its own findings and went beyond the relief sought.

It directed those respondents to file their objection by 13 November 2026 and required the Trial Court to decide the application, if the objection was filed by that date, by 15 December 2026.

The findings were expressly made tentative and were not to influence the Trial Court’s independent determination of the injunction application or suit; CAN 1 of 2026 was disposed of, with no order as to costs.