A sub-tenant inducted after the eviction decree remains bound by that decree.

A suit for eviction and possession was instituted by Shanti Prapan Sharma against Commercial Motors and eight others on the grounds of termination of tenancy, subletting, and default in payment of rent.

The suit was decreed on 16 July 1998; the defendants’ first appeal and two second appeals were subsequently dismissed.

The Supreme Court dismissed the special leave petitions on 11 March 2011, while granting time to vacate until the end of September 2011 subject to an undertaking, including non-induction of third parties into the premises.

After the plaintiff’s death, his legal representatives alleged before the Supreme Court that the judgment-debtors had inducted Om Prakash Gupta, the present petitioner, as a sub-tenant.

The contempt petition was permitted to be withdrawn with liberty to pursue other remedies.

In the subsequent execution proceedings, the petitioner objected that he had been in possession of the shops since 1994, had not been impleaded in the eviction suit, and was therefore not bound by the decree.

His objection, tried as a proceeding under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC, was rejected.

The Executing Court held that he had stepped into the shoes of the original defendants, had failed to prove an independent tenancy from the landlord, and had been inducted by the judgment-debtor after the decree.

The District Judge dismissed his appeal on 6 August 2026, leading to the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution.

1. Whether the petitioner, who claimed an independent right of possession and alleged that he had been in possession since 1994, was bound by the eviction decree passed against the original defendants.

2. Whether the High Court should interfere under Article 227 of the Constitution with the concurrent factual findings of the Executing Court and the appellate court.

The Court applied Order XXI Rule 97 CPC, under which resistance or obstruction to delivery of possession in execution may be adjudicated by the executing court, including determination of the objector’s right or interest in the property.

It also applied Article 227 of the Constitution, under which the High Court exercises supervisory—not appellate—jurisdiction and ordinarily does not interfere with concurrent findings of fact unless there is jurisdictional error, perversity, or a serious legal infirmity.

The Court also considered the binding effect of the eviction decree and the Supreme Court’s direction restraining induction of third parties into the premises during the extended period for vacating.

The Executing Court had assessed the petitioner’s claim of possession since 1994 and found it unsupported by rent receipts or other evidence establishing an independent tenancy from the landlord.

Instead, it found that the petitioner had been inducted by the judgment-debtor after the decree and had effectively stepped into the shoes of the original defendants.

The District Judge affirmed those factual findings.

Since the petitioner failed to demonstrate an independent right of possession or any perversity in the concurrent findings, the High Court held that its limited supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 could not be used to reappreciate the evidence or substitute its own factual conclusions.

It held that the petitioner was not in possession in his own independent right and was bound by the decree as a person inducted by the judgment-debtor after the decision in the eviction suit.

Finding no ground for interference under Article 227, the Court dismissed the writ petition and made no order as to costs.