Absent credible proximate instigation, a doubtful dying declaration cannot sustain conviction for abetment of suicide.

Hina, who had previously been married and had three children, remarried the respondent, Arjunsinh Bhikhusinh Parmar, in January 2010. The prosecution alleged that she was subjected to harassment and physical torture by her husband and in-laws. On 29 July 2010, she went to her parental home, and on 1 August 2010 sustained extensive burn injuries in the kitchen. She was taken to hospital but died from her injuries. A criminal case was registered for offences under Sections 498A and 306 of the Indian Penal Code, among other provisions, and the respondent was charged before the Sessions Court

The prosecution relied, inter alia, upon the alleged dying declaration and statement/FIR recorded by the Investigating Officer. The trial Court found that the prosecution had failed to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt and acquitted the respondent on 28 December 2011. The State preferred an appeal against the acquittal under Section 378(1) and (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

The High Court noted that the medical evidence indicated 95%–97% burns, extensive facial injuries, charred particles in the trachea, and swelling in the mouth and tongue, rendering it doubtful that the deceased could speak. Neither the Investigating Officer nor the Executive Magistrate obtained a medical certification that she was conscious, oriented, and fit to make a statement. The close relatives also did not support the prosecution case, and the evidence did not establish any interaction between the respondent and the deceased during the four days preceding the incident

1. Whether the trial Court correctly acquitted the respondent of the offences under Sections 498A and 306 of the IPC and related provisions

2. Whether the trial Court properly appreciated the oral and documentary evidence, including the alleged dying declaration and FIR/statement

3. Whether the acquittal suffered from any illegality, irregularity, perversity, or manifest error warranting appellate interference

4. Whether the prosecution established cruelty, abetment, or a proximate act of instigation by the respondent sufficient to attract Sections 498A and 306 IPC and the presumptions under Sections 113A or 113B of the Evidence Act

The Court applied Section 306 IPC, which punishes abetment of suicide, read with Section 107 IPC, requiring instigation, conspiracy, or intentional aid; abetment ordinarily requires a positive, intentional, and proximate act capable of driving the deceased to suicide

Section 498A IPC requires proof of cruelty as statutorily defined. Section 113A of the Evidence Act permits, but does not compel, a presumption of abetment of suicide by a married woman within seven years of marriage where cruelty by the husband or his relative is first established; the Court also considered the prosecution’s reliance on Section 113B

A dying declaration may independently sustain conviction if voluntary, truthful, reliable, properly recorded, and made by a declarant competent and fit to speak; the Court relied on Irfan alias Naka v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2023 SC 4129, for the relevant reliability factors

In an appeal against acquittal, the appellate court may reappreciate the evidence, but the accused enjoys a reinforced or “double presumption” of innocence; where two reasonable views are possible, the acquittal should not be disturbed. These principles were drawn from Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415; Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471; Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 8 SCC 149; and Ramesh v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 9 SCC 169

The High Court held that the alleged dying declaration and FIR/statement could not safely be relied upon because the deceased had suffered 95%–97% burns and the doctor found that, owing to the injuries to her face, mouth, tongue, and trachea, she was likely incapable of speaking. The absence of a medical endorsement confirming her fitness to make a statement further undermined their reliability

The medical and scene-of-offence evidence also left open the possibility of accidental burns while the deceased was preparing tea; a burnt quilt was found near the stove, and the doctor accepted that the injuries could have been accidental

The prosecution witnesses, including close relatives, did not support the case, and no independent witness corroborated the allegations of cruelty or harassment

Even assuming that the deceased’s allegation that the respondent suspected her character was true, the prosecution failed to establish a proximate or intentional act of instigation. She had been at her parental home for four days before the incident, and there was no evidence that the respondent had met, spoken to, or contacted her during that period

Consequently, the foundational facts necessary for drawing presumptions under Sections 113A or 113B were not proved, and the statutory ingredients of cruelty and abetment remained unestablished

Since the trial Court’s view was reasonably supported by the evidence and was not perverse or manifestly illegal, the reinforced presumption in favour of the acquitted respondent precluded appellate interference

The State’s appeal was accordingly dismissed, the trial Court’s judgment and order of acquittal were confirmed, the respondent’s bail bond was cancelled, and the record and proceedings were directed to be returned to the trial Court