Acceptance and retention of settlement benefits without protest defeat a later fraud challenge to voluntary retirement.

The petitioners, workmen of the respondent, formed a union in September 1998 and alleged that their relations with the management thereafter deteriorated.

They went on strike from 3 September 1998 to 15 September 1998, allegedly calling it off on the management’s assurance that their demands would be addressed.

On 16 September 1998, the petitioners signed an agreement recording their voluntary retirement and received their dues and retiral benefits.

They later alleged that their signatures had been procured by fraud and coercion on the representation that the establishment would close immediately, and sought reinstatement.

The Industrial Tribunal rejected the claim for reinstatement, finding that the petitioners had voluntarily entered into the settlement and had not alleged or proved that they were paid less than their entitlement or had accepted the amount under protest.

The petitioners challenged that award under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Whether the Industrial Tribunal’s finding that the petitioners voluntarily entered into the retirement settlement was perverse or otherwise warranted interference under Article 226 of the Constitution

Whether the petitioners were entitled to reinstatement on the ground that the voluntary retirement agreement dated 16 September 1998 had been obtained by fraud, coercion, or through an unauthorised person

The Court applied the principle that the High Court’s jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is supervisory and not appellate; it cannot substitute its own view for that of an Industrial Adjudicator unless the award is arbitrary, irrational, or perverse.

The Court further applied the principle that a party who knowingly executes a settlement, accepts and retains the consideration without protest, and subsequently acts upon the settlement cannot ordinarily challenge it on the basis of fraud or coercion without a substantiated factual foundation.

The Court also considered the evidentiary significance of the petitioners’ failure to plead or prove that the settlement amount was deficient or accepted under protest.

The Court found no basis to disturb the Tribunal’s factual conclusion.

The agreement was signed individually by the workmen as well as by the union President and General Secretary, and it recorded that the settlement followed negotiations on 16 September 1998.

The petitioners did not dispute execution of the agreement, receipt of their full dues, or retention of the money without protest.

Their subsequent conduct also undermined the allegation of fraud: the General Secretary applied on 17 September 1998 for experience or character certificates for the workmen, an application whose issuance was admitted.

The management’s evidence further established that the agreement had been executed by a competent representative.

The substantial delay in raising the industrial dispute— from 1998 until 2003—also weakened the petitioners’ claim of immediate coercion or fraud.

Since the Tribunal’s findings were neither arbitrary nor perverse, the limited scope of Article 226 review did not permit interference.

The Industrial Tribunal’s refusal to grant reinstatement was neither arbitrary nor perverse.

The writ petition was accordingly dismissed.