Acquittal cannot be reversed where the trial court’s view is a possible view on the evidence.

On 8 June 2015, the prosecutrix alleged that while returning from Chiklod Market to her village, the respondent caught her hand, attempted to drag her towards a pit, outraged her modesty, and threatened to kill her if she reported the incident.

Two persons, Bablu and Ajab Singh, allegedly reached the spot after hearing her cries, whereupon the respondent fled. A case was registered under Sections 354 and 506 of the IPC and Sections 7 and 8 of the POCSO Act.

After investigation, a charge-sheet was filed and the case was committed to the Sessions Court.

The prosecution examined nine witnesses, including the prosecutrix, her mother, and alleged independent witnesses Om Prakash and Ajab Singh. The Additional Sessions Judge acquitted the respondent of all charges. The State accordingly sought leave to appeal against the acquittal under Section 378 of the CrPC.

Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent committed an act with the intention of outraging the prosecutrix’s modesty, thereby attracting Section 354 of the IPC?

Whether the prosecution established the ingredients of criminal intimidation punishable under Section 506 Part II of the IPC?

Whether the trial court’s acquittal was perverse, illegal, or otherwise amenable to interference in an appeal against acquittal?

The Court considered Sections 354 and 506 Part II of the IPC and Sections 7 and 8 of the POCSO Act, requiring proof of the acts and requisite intention constituting the charged offences.

In an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of the CrPC, the acquittal strengthens the presumption of innocence; although the appellate court may reappreciate the evidence, it cannot reverse a legally possible view merely because another view is possible.

Interference is justified only where the acquittal is patently perverse, based on misreading or omission of material evidence, or where no two reasonable views are possible and guilt is the only conclusion supported by the evidence.

The Court also applied the principles in Mallappa v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 3 SCC 544, that selective appreciation of evidence is impermissible and that a legally plausible view favouring the accused ordinarily must be maintained.

Although the prosecutrix supported the prosecution case, her mother was not an eyewitness and her evidence was based solely on the prosecutrix’s account.

The Court noted that the evidence of the prosecutrix and the independent witnesses established, at most, a verbal dispute and exchange of abuses; their cross-examination did not support the existence of a physical scuffle, as the parties remained at some distance while conversing.

The prosecutrix’s material allegation that the respondent pressed her breast was absent from both the FIR and her Section 164 CrPC statement.

The allegation that he caught hold of her hands was also affected by inconsistencies.

The independent witnesses did not describe any overt act accompanied by an intention to outrage her modesty.

Consequently, the essential ingredients of Section 354 IPC were not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

The evidence concerning the alleged threat was likewise insufficient to establish Section 506 Part II IPC.

Since the trial court’s view was based on a proper appreciation of the evidence and was at least a possible and legally sustainable view, the heightened standard governing appellate interference with acquittal was not satisfied.

The trial court’s acquittal was neither perverse nor legally erroneous and did not warrant appellate interference.

The application for leave to appeal, I.A. No. 23148 of 2022, was dismissed, and consequently the State’s criminal appeal was also dismissed.