Ad-interim proceedings cannot culminate in a blanket injunction lasting until suit disposal.

The respondent-plaintiff instituted a suit challenging an eviction notice dated 25 August 2026 issued by the appellant-lessor under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The respondent sought protection of its possession over the suit premises.

The lease deed had been executed with the West Bengal Trinamool Youth Congress, described as a unit of the All India Trinamool Congress. The appellant alleged default and other breaches of the registered lease deed and contended that the notice validly terminated the tenancy under Sections 106 and 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

At the ad-interim stage of the temporary injunction application, the Trial Court directed the parties to maintain status quo in respect of the suit premises till disposal of the suit.

The appellant challenged the order on the grounds that it effectively disposed of the injunction application, exceeded the scope of the application, and ignored the alleged statutory bars to the suit.

Whether the Trial Court exceeded its jurisdiction by granting a blanket order of status quo until disposal of the suit when the matter was only at the ad-interim stage of the temporary injunction application?

Whether the suit and the prayer for injunction were prima facie barred under Sections 41(a) and 41(e), read with Section 14(d), of the Specific Relief Act, 1963?

Whether the eviction notice was invalid for failure to comply with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and Clause 7.1 of the lease deed?

Whether the discrepancy between the entity named as lessee in the lease deed and the plaintiff instituting the suit affected the maintainability of the suit?

The Court considered Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which governs termination of certain leases by notice, subject to the contract between the parties; Section 111, which recognises determination of a lease, including on the occurrence of specified contractual events or breaches; and the contractual termination mechanism under Clause 7.1 of the lease deed, requiring, according to the respondent’s case, six consecutive months of rent default followed by at least 15 days’ notice.

The Court also considered Sections 14(d), 41(a), and 41(e) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963: an injunction cannot be granted to restrain proceedings before a court not subordinate to the court granting the injunction; an agreement whose performance is not specifically enforceable cannot ordinarily be enforced by injunction; and an injunction cannot be granted to prevent breach of a contract whose performance would not be specifically enforced.

Procedurally, an ad-interim order must not effectively dispose of the substantive temporary injunction application, particularly where the opposite party has not filed its written objection or expressly waived its right to contest the application on merits.

The Court found that the appellant had raised arguable questions concerning the validity of the eviction notice, the applicability of Sections 106 and 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, the contractual requirement of 15 days’ notice, and the alleged statutory bars under the Specific Relief Act.

Whether an actual breach of the lease had occurred was held to be a triable factual and legal issue.

The identity of the plaintiff was also not conclusively determinative at the interlocutory stage because the eviction notice itself appeared to treat the named lessee as a unit of the plaintiff organisation, thereby giving rise to an arguable case on maintainability.

However, the Trial Court’s blanket status quo order was impermissible because it granted protection until disposal of the suit, although the matter was only at the ad-interim stage of the temporary injunction application.

The appellant had not filed a written objection or specifically relinquished the right to contest the injunction application on merits.

The High Court therefore held that the Trial Court had acted beyond jurisdiction, while also concluding that limited interim protection was necessary to preserve the respondent’s possession pending final determination of the injunction application.

The appellant was restrained from disturbing the respondent’s peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property until disposal of the temporary injunction application, except in accordance with law and by following due process of law.

The appellant was directed to file its written objection to the injunction application within two weeks, and the Trial Court was requested to dispose of the application expeditiously, preferably within two weeks of its reopening after the Annual Vacation.

All questions regarding maintainability, validity of the eviction notice, contractual breach, and the applicability of the relevant statutory provisions were expressly left open for determination by the Trial Court.

CAN 1 of 2026 was consequentially disposed of, with no order as to costs.