Administrative processing and reopening of a claim preclude its subsequent rejection on the ground of limitation.

The Petitioner’s grandfather, Mr. Sullar, owned land in Village Dallupura acquired in 1967

After Mr. Sullar’s death in 1980, his son, Mr. Santa, pursued an alternative plot under the 1961 LSADD Scheme

Mr. Santa allegedly applied in 1982, evidenced by a departmental communication dated March 6, 1982, and a dispatch register entry

In 1988, Mr. Santa submitted a "prescribed form" application, referencing his 1982 claim

The Land and Building Department closed the case in 1993 for lack of documents but "reopened" it in 1997

The case was processed for 16 years until the Recommendation Committee rejected it on August 16, 2013, on the grounds that the 1988 application was time-barred (submitted more than three months after the 1982 compensation receipt)

1. Whether the finding that the claim was first made in 1988 is sustainable in light of the Department’s own dispatch records from 1982?

2. Whether the decision to reopen the case in 1997 and the subsequent decade-long processing legally precluded a summary rejection on grounds of limitation?

The Court applied the Large Scale Acquisition, Development and Disposal of Land in Delhi (LSADD) Scheme, 1961, noting it is a rehabilitative administrative scheme rather than a vested right

Full Bench decision in Ramanand v. Union of India, establishing that while there is no absolute right to a plot, there is a right to be "eligible to be considered" fairly

The Court invoked the "reasons" doctrine from Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, which mandates that the validity of an administrative order must be judged solely by the reasons stated therein and cannot be improved by subsequent affidavits

GNCTD v. Sanjay, emphasizing that rehabilitative claims should not be rejected mechanically on limitation grounds without considering specific facts

The Respondents’ own dispatch register confirmed a 1982 communication (File No. F.30(21)/1/82/L&B/PHC) addressed to the LAC and Mr. Santa, contradicting the claim that the 1988 application was the first contact

The Court reasoned that the 1988 filing was a continuation of the 1982 process, not a fresh claim

The Recommendation Committee’s 1997 decision to move the case from the "Condonation" category to the "Reopening" category signified an administrative acknowledgment that the claim was alive

By processing the claim until 2012 and repeatedly seeking documents, the Department treated the application as validly filed

The court held that the Committee failed to apply its mind to these internal records, rendering the rejection arbitrary and inconsistent with the 1982-1997 history

It held that the 1988 application must be treated as a continuation of the 1982 proceedings and cannot be rejected as time-barred

The Respondents were directed to reconsider the Petitioner’s claim on merits—including title, compensation, and legal heirship—within twelve weeks, after granting the Petitioner a personal hearing