Adverse inference from plaintiff’s non-appearance is rebuttable by manager’s testimony based on personal knowledge.

Anil Kishore Seth (plaintiff) entered into an agreement to sell agricultural land with Russi Fisheries P. Ltd. (defendant) on 18.07.1988 for a total consideration of Rs. 15,41,000/-

The plaintiff paid Rs. 2,75,000/- via cheque and allegedly paid Rs. 5,00,000/- in cash to the defendant's son (defendant No. 3), who acted as a director

The deadline for the sale deed was extended to 30.06.1989, but the defendants failed to appear for execution

The trial court dismissed the suit for specific performance, citing a lack of readiness and willingness, but ordered a refund of the cheque amount

The First Appellate Court reversed this, granting specific performance

During the pendency of the Second Appeal and subsequent SLP, the defendants sold portions of the land to third parties in 2009 and 2025

Meanwhile, the plaintiffs obtained a court-executed sale deed on 08.01.2010

The Court applied Section 100 of the CPC, establishing that findings of fact cannot be disturbed in a Second Appeal unless found to be perverse

It followed Bholaram v. Ameerchand and Kulwant Kaur v. Gurdial Singh Mann to restrict interference to substantial questions of law.

Regarding pendente lite transfers, the Court applied Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and the doctrine of lis pendens as interpreted in Thomson Press (India) Ltd. v. Nanak Builders & Investors (P) Ltd.

On evidence, it applied the principle of adverse inference for non-appearance of a party under Vidhyadhar v. Manikrao

held that a Manager/Power of Attorney can depose on matters within their personal knowledge per Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani v. Indusind Bank Ltd.

The Court held that readiness, willingness, and the validity of cash payments were factual determinations made by the First Appellate Court based on evidence, including a handwriting expert's testimony and the conduct of the parties

Because these findings were not perverse, the High Court correctly refused to re-evaluate them under Section 100 CPC

Regarding the plaintiff's absence from the witness box, the Court reasoned that the adverse inference was rebutted because the plaintiff’s Manager (PW-4) possessed personal knowledge of the transactions and corroborated the plaint

On the issue of lis pendens, the Court determined that the defendants' sales to third parties during litigation were subservient to the final decree and thus "non est"

Finally, the Court rejected the "inequity" argument, noting the defendants failed to provide evidence of price escalation and that substantive rights had already accrued to the plaintiffs via the 2010 court-executed deed

It held that the First Appellate Court’s findings of fact were binding and that the non-appearance of the plaintiff was cured by the competent testimony of his Manager

The Court further declared the sale deeds executed by the defendants in 2009 and 2025 as non est under the doctrine of lis pendens

The decree as passed by the First Appellate Court was maintained