After 23½ Years, P&H HC Replaces Jail Terms For First-Time Arms Act Convicts With One-Year Probation

In brief

The question

Whether the appellants’ conviction under Section 25 of the Arms Act warranted appellate interference, despite their stated decision not to challenge it.

The court held

The appeal was dismissed insofar as it challenged conviction, and the finding of guilt under Section 25 of the Arms Act was affirmed.

It also directed

The appeal was partly allowed on sentence: the custodial sentence was modified, and the appellants were released on probation for one year upon furnishing bonds and undertaking to keep the peace and maintain good behaviour.

The court directed that they would be liable to receive sentence if they defaulted on the probation conditions.

01Facts

The appellants were convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge, Sonepat, under Section 25 of the Arms Act and sentenced to one year’s rigorous imprisonment and a fine of ₹500 each.

pp. 1, paras 1–3

The prosecution case arose from a police raid following secret information that armed persons were assembling to plan a dacoity.

pp. 2–3, paras 4–5

In appeal, the appellants expressly did not challenge their conviction and confined their challenge to sentence, seeking probation on the grounds of the passage of more than 23½ years, their status as first offenders, and the absence of subsequent prosecutions.

pp. 4–5, paras 9–11

A Probation Officer’s report was received and taken on record.

p. 6, para 16

02Issues

i.Whether the appellants’ conviction under Section 25 of the Arms Act warranted appellate interference, despite their stated decision not to challenge it.

p. 5, paras 9, 15

ii.Whether the appellants could be released on probation despite the court’s observation that the offence carried a minimum sentence of seven years.

pp. 9–10, paras 20–24

03Law Applied

Section 25 of the Arms Act governed the offence of conviction; the judgment records that it carried a minimum sentence of seven years and a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.

p. 9, para 20

The court relied on Jugal Kishore Prasad v. State of Bihar, (1972) 2 SCC 633, concerning the reformative purpose of probation and the avoidance of imprisonment in appropriate cases.

pp. 6–7, para 18

It also relied on Chellammal v. State, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 870, for the proposition that, where Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act applies, the court must consider probation and give reasons if it declines to grant it.

pp. 7–9, para 19

The court further cited Lakhvir Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 2021 SC 555, and Amit Singh v. State of Rajasthan, Criminal Appeal Nos. 4860–4861 of 2024, in support of probation being available in cases involving offences with minimum sentences, including an Arms Act offence.

pp. 9, paras 22–23

The judgment ultimately ordered release on probation under Section 360 CrPC.

p. 10, para 24

Provisions in the judgment · 11 · Linked ones open on LawLens

Indian Penal Code, 1860 Section 399 Section 402 Section 397

Arms Act, 1959 Section 25

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Section 161 Section 173 Section 360 Section 361

Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 Section 6 Section 3 Section 4

04Reasoning

The court affirmed the conviction after finding the prosecution evidence consistent and sufficient, notwithstanding the appellants’ decision not to contest it.

p. 5, para 15

On sentence, it considered the long period since the 2002 incident, the prolonged litigation, the appellants’ first-offender status, and the absence of any later prosecution.

p. 6, 10, paras 17, 24

It rejected the State’s argument that the stated minimum sentence precluded probation, relying on authorities recognising probation in cases involving minimum sentences.

pp. 9–10, paras 21–23

In light of the circumstances and the Probation Officer’s report, it concluded that probation would better serve the ends of justice.

p. 6, 10, paras 16, 24