After divorce, retained stridhan is no longer a continuing offence, Himachal Pradesh High Court rules; complaint filed after three years quashed

Kanchan Lata filed a complaint under Sections 406 and 506 IPC alleging that her husband, Tota Ram, had retained her istridhan and threatened her.

The parties married in 2007 and, according to the complainant, had been living separately since approximately 2008; she claimed to have sought return of the istridhan from 2011.

Their marriage was dissolved by a decree of divorce dated 9 October 2012. The complaint was filed on 19 July 2017.

After the Magistrate summoned Tota Ram and later issued notice of accusation, he petitioned under Section 482 CrPC to quash the proceedings, principally on the ground that they were time-barred.

Whether the alleged retention of istridhan constituted a continuing offence after the parties’ marriage had been dissolved, such that the complaint was not barred by limitation.

Whether the complaint, filed more than three years after the asserted demands for return of the istridhan and the decree of divorce, was barred by Section 468 CrPC.

Section 468 CrPC bars a court from taking cognizance after the prescribed limitation period; the Court treated the limitation period applicable to the offences alleged under Sections 406 and 506 IPC as three years.

Applying Krishna Bhattacharjee v. Sarathi Choudhury, (2016) 2 SCC 705, the Court distinguished judicial separation, which does not end the marital relationship and may leave retention of istridhan as a continuing offence, from dissolution of marriage, which severs the parties’ status as husband and wife; in the latter situation, the alleged offence is not continuing on that basis.

The complainant’s own case was that demands for return of the istridhan had been made since 2011, while the complaint was filed on 19 July 2017.

The Court also found that the marriage had been dissolved on 9 October 2012, severing the marital relationship. It therefore held that the continuing-offence principle applicable where the marital relationship remains intact did not apply.

Even using the divorce decree as the relevant point, the complaint was filed more than three years later; the Court accordingly found it barred by limitation.

It allowed the petition and quashed the proceedings before the JMFC, including the summoning order dated 1 June 2018, the notice of accusation dated 3 September 2022, and all consequential proceedings.