After enquiry, referral to a higher authority for major penalty requires fresh notice and hearing.

The petitioners, Constables appointed in the Railway Protection Special Force (RPSF) in 2015, were posted at 11 Battalion, RPSF, Garhara.

Following the killing of an Assistant Commandant by Constable Arjun Deshwal during election duty on 25 February 2018, messages, videos and appeals seeking moral and financial support for the accused circulated on social-media platforms.

The respondents alleged that Karam Jeet contributed ₹1,000 through the BHIM App and that Kamlesh Kumar Yadav shared a Facebook appeal requesting monetary contributions for the accused.

Separate charge memoranda dated 10 April 2018 alleged breach of discipline, promotion of indiscipline and incitement of disaffection under Section 18 of the Railway Protection Force Act, 1957, Section 3 of the Police (Incitement to Disaffection) Act, 1922, and Rules 146 and 147 of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1987.

After departmental enquiries, the charges were held proved.

The In-charge Assistant Commandant issued second show-cause notices, but, considering removal to be beyond his competence, referred the matter to the Deputy Security Commissioner, who imposed removal from service on 11 January 2019.

The appeals, revisions and mercy petitions were rejected.

The petitioners challenged the proceedings principally on the grounds of lack of procedural fairness, discriminatory punishment, and disproportionality.

1. Whether disciplinary proceedings initiated by an authority competent to impose only a minor penalty could, after completion of the enquiry, be referred to a higher authority solely for imposition of a major penalty without giving the delinquent employees a further opportunity of hearing?

2. Whether the petitioners were entitled to parity in punishment with similarly situated co-delinquents whose dismissal had been modified by the Appellate Authority to a lesser penalty?

3. Whether the High Court could interfere under Article 226 with the proportionality of the punishment where removal from service was alleged to be arbitrary, discriminatory or shockingly disproportionate to the proved misconduct?

The Court applied Rule 152.2 read with Schedule III of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1987, which permits an authority competent to impose a minor penalty to institute disciplinary proceedings even where the proposed punishment may be a major penalty, although that authority cannot itself impose removal or dismissal.

However, principles of natural justice require that where, after the enquiry and consideration of the delinquent’s reply, the matter is transferred to a higher authority for imposition of a major penalty, the employee must receive notice and an effective opportunity to represent before that competent authority.

Article 14 requires parity among similarly situated co-delinquents and prohibits unexplained discriminatory punishment, subject to material distinctions in role or culpability: Rajendra Yadav v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2013) 3 SCC 73, and Anand Regional Co-operative Oilseed Growers’ Union Ltd. v. Shaileshkumar Harshadbhai Shah, (2006) 6 SCC 548.

Conversely, different punishment may be justified where, for example, one employee admits guilt and seeks mercy while another contests the charge: Obettee (P) Ltd. v. Mohd. Shafiq Khan, (2005) 8 SCC 46.

Judicial review of punishment is limited, but intervention is permissible where the punishment is arbitrary, irrational, discriminatory or so disproportionate that it shocks the conscience of the Court: Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 611; B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749; Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386; and Union of India v. Dalbir Singh, (2021) 11 SCC 321.

The Court held that the In-charge Assistant Commandant was legally competent to initiate the proceedings despite lacking authority to impose removal.

Nevertheless, after issuing the enquiry report and second show-cause notices, the petitioners were entitled to understand that the matter would be placed before a higher authority for consideration of a major penalty.

Since no fresh notice or opportunity of representation was provided before the Deputy Security Commissioner imposed removal, the final stage of the proceedings violated natural justice.

The Court further found that the petitioners’ conduct—making nominal financial contributions and sharing or acting upon social-media material under emotional influence—was substantially similar to that of co-delinquents from the same incident.

The respondents failed to identify any material distinction justifying the petitioners’ removal when other personnel had received lesser penalties and had been reinstated.

Although the conduct constituted misconduct warranting disciplinary action, there was no finding that the petitioners had participated in violence, mutiny, rebellion, refusal to obey orders or obstruction of official duties.

Given their short service, admitted lapse, remorse and the differential treatment of co-delinquents, removal was held to be grossly disproportionate and conscience-shocking.

It held that initiation by the minor-penalty authority was valid, but referral to the higher authority for a major penalty without a fresh opportunity of hearing was procedurally unlawful.

The authorities also failed to maintain parity with similarly situated co-delinquents, and the punishment of removal was disproportionate to the proved misconduct.

The orders of removal dated 11 January 2019, along with the appellate, revisional and mercy-petition orders, were quashed.

The respondents were directed to reinstate both petitioners and impose upon them the same minor penalty awarded to the similarly situated co-delinquents, with corresponding consequential benefits.

Both writ petitions were allowed, with no order as to costs.