Allahabad HC Sets Aside Husband’s Dowry-Death Life Term After Upholding In-Laws’ Murder Convictions, Convicts Him Of Cruelty And Dowry Demand

Ajmat Jahan died from burn injuries four days after she was burned at her in-laws’ home, within approximately one and a half years of her marriage.

Her father lodged an FIR the following day alleging dowry-related cruelty and that her husband and in-laws had set her on fire.

In a dying declaration recorded by a Naib Tehsildar in the presence of a doctor, the deceased attributed the burning to her mother-in-law and father-in-law, and separately stated that her husband beat her over demands for a motorcycle and television.

Her parents and brother were declared hostile, but their testimony supported aspects of the prosecution case, including the marriage, the death from burns, and the location of the incident.

The trial court convicted the husband under Section 304-B IPC and convicted the parents-in-law under Sections 302/34 IPC, 498-A IPC and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The husband appealed his conviction; the parents-in-law appealed theirs.

Section 302 IPC addresses murder, while Section 304-B IPC applies where a woman’s death otherwise than under normal circumstances occurs within seven years of marriage and she was subjected, soon before her death, to cruelty or harassment in connection with a dowry demand; upon proof of the statutory foundational facts, Section 113-B of the Evidence Act requires the court to presume that the accused caused the dowry death.

The Court relied on Jasvinder Saini v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) and Vijay Pal Singh v. State of Uttarakhand for the principle that Section 304-B is not a substitute for Section 302 and that homicide evidence must be assessed as such.

It also referred to Shamnsaheb M. Multtani v. State of Karnataka concerning the operation of the Section 113-B presumption.

A dying declaration may support conviction where the court is satisfied that the maker was fit to give it and the statement is reliable; the Court considered the doctor’s and recorder’s evidence on fitness.

Section 498-A IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act were applied to the deceased’s account of her husband’s beatings and demands for a motorcycle and television.

The Court accepted the dying declaration because the doctor certified the deceased fit to give a statement, the Naib Tehsildar confirmed that she spoke clearly, and the defence did not materially undermine either witness’s evidence.

The Court found that the declaration implicated the parents-in-law in the burning but did not place the husband at the scene or identify him as a participant in the killing; the evidence therefore supported their convictions for murder, while the husband’s presence and participation in the death were not proved.

It held that, given the prosecution’s proof that the parents-in-law committed the murder, the husband could not be convicted of dowry death by relying on the Section 113-B presumption in this case; it accordingly set aside his Section 304-B conviction.

However, the declaration directly supported the separate findings that the husband beat the deceased over dowry-related demands, establishing his liability under Section 498-A IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

It imposed three years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 10,000 under Section 498-A, and two years’ simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 10,000 under Section 4; as he had already undergone the sentences imposed, it directed his release, subject to compliance with Section 437-A CrPC.

The Court dismissed the appeals of the parents-in-law, leaving their convictions and sentences undisturbed.