Allahabad HC upholds second FIR over courtroom violence, citing a distinct perspective on the same incident

On 25 October 2018, several advocates, allegedly including the appellant, entered a courtroom at Kanpur Nagar where four accused persons were in judicial custody. A disturbance allegedly occurred, followed by an assault on the persons in custody, causing injuries and disrupting court proceedings.

An FIR, Case Crime No. 312 of 2018, was registered on 25 October 2018 under Sections 147, 323 and 500 IPC against the appellant, Ajay Kumar Yadav, and approximately 100–150 unknown advocates, alleging assault on the persons in custody.

On 26 October 2018, a second FIR, Case Crime No. 314 of 2018, was registered on the complaint of the Court Moharrim under Sections 228 and 323 IPC and Section 7 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, alleging obstruction and disturbance of courtroom proceedings and assault by the advocates.

The appellant challenged the second FIR as impermissible, contending that both FIRs concerned the same occurrence and that the first FIR had to be treated as the primary FIR.

The State argued that the second FIR reflected a distinct perspective of the courtroom incident and was legally maintainable.

Whether the second FIR, Case Crime No. 314 of 2018, was impermissible because it related to the same incident already covered by Case Crime No. 312 of 2018.

Whether the second FIR was maintainable because it presented a distinct perspective concerning the disturbance and obstruction of judicial proceedings.

The Court considered Sections 154, 155, 156, 157, 161, 162, 169, 170 and 173 Cr.P.C., including the principle in T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala, 2001 AIR SC 2637, that ordinarily there can be no second FIR or fresh investigation concerning the same cognizable offence, occurrence or transaction; subsequent information should ordinarily be treated as a statement under Section 162 Cr.P.C.

The Court also relied on Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash, 2005 SCC (Cri.) 211, which recognised that a counter-version of the same incident may be independently brought before the police and that an absolute prohibition would cause injustice.

It further relied on Adarsh Kumar Tripathi v. State of U.P., (2005) 53 ACC 292, for the proposition that a subsequent FIR is not barred where it discloses a larger conspiracy, and on Anurag Tripathi v. State of U.P., (2005) 52 ACC 563, holding that proceedings seeking investigation against specifically named accused persons may be maintainable notwithstanding an earlier FIR against unknown persons concerning the same incident.

Although both FIRs arose from the courtroom occurrence of 25 October 2018, the Court held that they represented different perspectives.

The first FIR primarily alleged an assault on persons in judicial custody by a large group of advocates, whereas the second FIR was lodged by the Court Moharrim and specifically concerned the disruption and obstruction of court proceedings, the alleged assault within the courtroom, and the challenge to the majesty of law.

Applying the principles recognised in Upkar Singh and the decisions of this Court, the Court concluded that the bar against a second FIR is not absolute where the subsequent version discloses a distinct aspect or counter-version of the occurrence.

The exceptional nature of the alleged conduct and its direct impact on the functioning of the court further justified treating the second FIR as maintainable.

It found that the second FIR had been lodged from the distinct perspective of disruption and obstruction of courtroom proceedings and was legally maintainable.

The criminal appeal was accordingly dismissed for lack of merit.