Alleged ulterior motive alone does not invalidate no-confidence proceedings absent cogent evidence of mala fides.

The petitioner, Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat Kutela, challenged the Sub-Divisional Officer-cum-Prescribed Authority’s notice dated 24 September 2026 convening a meeting on 5 October 2026 to consider a no-confidence motion against her.

She alleged that the motion had been initiated with an ulterior motive because she had complained against the former Sarpanch and others said to be related to the present Up-Sarpanch.

The State submitted that the motion had been initiated by 16 Panchas and the Up-Sarpanch, and that the Prescribed Authority had verified the application before convening the meeting.

The petitioner sought to quash the notice and the ensuing proceedings.

Whether the allegation that the no-confidence motion was initiated with an ulterior motive, in light of the petitioner’s prior complaint against persons related to the Up-Sarpanch, was sufficient to invalidate the proceedings

Whether the notice convening the meeting was liable to be set aside for any demonstrated breach of Section 21(3) of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993, or because the procedure caused substantial prejudice to the petitioner.

Section 21 of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993 governs no-confidence motions against a Sarpanch or Up-Sarpanch: Section 21(1) prescribes the majority required to pass the motion; Section 21(2) provides for the meeting and the office-holder’s right to participate; and Section 21(3) bars a motion during specified periods.

The Court also applied the principles discussed in Smt. Janki Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh, including the Full Bench decision in Bhulin Dewangan v. State of M.P. and Sahasram Jangde v. State of Chhattisgarh: procedural non-compliance does not invariably nullify no-confidence proceedings; the decision-maker may consider whether it caused serious prejudice or a failure of justice.

A claim of mala fides must be supported by cogent material showing misuse of the statutory process or illegality.

The petitioner’s prior complaint and the alleged relationship between its subjects and the Up-Sarpanch, without further supporting material, did not establish mala fides or show that the statutory process had been misused.

The Court treated the challenged notice as convening a meeting for consideration of the motion, with the outcome dependent on the vote and applicable statutory requirements.

It found no demonstrated violation of the statutory bar in Section 21(3), and no specific or substantial prejudice caused by the procedure adopted.

The Court therefore declined to prevent the meeting from proceeding.

It clarified that it had expressed no opinion on the merits of the allegations in the motion and directed that the competent authority proceed in accordance with law.