An appellate court may grant mutual-consent divorce after verifying the parties’ voluntary settlement.

The husband appealed under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984, against the Family Court’s judgment dated 19 January 2023 dismissing his petition for divorce under Sections 13(1)(ia) and 13(1)(ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

During the appeal, the parties filed a joint settlement providing, among other terms, for payment of ₹30,00,000 as permanent alimony and the wife’s withdrawal of cases pending against the husband.

They then jointly sought dissolution of their marriage by mutual consent under Section 13B, stating that they had lived separately for about ten years and that the marriage had irretrievably broken down.

The parties appeared before the Court, confirmed the settlement and consented to divorce voluntarily.

Whether the parties’ joint petition for divorce by mutual consent under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act could be accepted and the marriage dissolved in the appeal.

Whether the Family Court’s judgment should be substituted by a decree dissolving the marriage in accordance with the parties’ compromise.

Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 provides for divorce by mutual consent.

The Court also referred to Amardeep Singh v. Harvin Kaur, (2017) 8 SCC 746, concerning waiver of the statutory waiting period for a mutual-consent divorce; it found no legal impediment to accepting the parties’ petition in light of that decision.

The parties’ compromise petition was filed under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, read with Section 13B of the Act.

The Court recorded that both parties were present, had signed the compromise petition with their counsel, and confirmed that their consent was voluntary and free from coercion.

Having accepted the petition’s contents and considered the parties’ request for mutual divorce, the Court concluded that the petition could be allowed under Section 13B, with no legal impediment in view of Amardeep Singh.

The Court did not decide the merits of the husband’s original cruelty and desertion grounds.

It substituted its judgment for the Family Court’s judgment and order, disposed of the appeal in terms of the compromise, and directed that a decree be drawn accordingly.