An appellate court must not disturb acquittal where two reasonable views arise from the evidence.

The prosecution alleged that, owing to the deceased Vallabhbhai Bijalbhai’s prior abduction of Anuben, the minor daughter of Hakka Pola Bharwad, the accused abducted and assaulted him on 2 September 1996.

According to the prosecution, accused No. 5 stopped the deceased’s Matador, accused No. 1 tied and assaulted him with a stick, and accused Nos. 2 and 3 subsequently inflicted further stick blows while accused No. 4 allegedly drove a motorcycle.

The deceased sustained injuries and later died during treatment.

The accused were charged under Sections 302, 364, 120B, 342 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act.

After recording oral and documentary evidence and the accused’s statements under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Sessions Court, Rajkot, acquitted all accused by judgment dated 21 September 1998.

The State preferred the present appeal under Section 378(1) and (3) CrPC against the acquittal.

Whether the trial Court was justified in acquitting the accused of the offences charged?

Whether the trial Court properly appreciated the oral and documentary evidence led by the prosecution?

Whether the impugned judgment of acquittal suffered from any illegality, irregularity or perversity warranting appellate interference?

The Court considered the prosecution charges under Sections 302, 364, 120B, 342 and 114 IPC and Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act, and the State’s appellate remedy under Section 378 CrPC.

It applied the principle that an appellate court may review, reappreciate and reconsider evidence in an appeal against acquittal, but must recognise the strengthened or “double” presumption of innocence in favour of the accused.

Where two reasonable conclusions are possible, the acquittal should not ordinarily be disturbed unless the trial Court’s view is manifestly illegal, perverse or impossible.

These principles were drawn principally from Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415; Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471; Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 8 SCC 149; and Ramesh v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 9 SCC 169.

The Court also applied the rule that the quality and reliability of evidence, rather than the number of witnesses, determines whether a conviction can be sustained, as recognised in Masalti v. State of Uttar Pradesh and related authorities.

The Court held that the prosecution evidence did not establish the accused’s identity or their participation beyond reasonable doubt.

The principal eyewitness, the Matador cleaner, did not identify accused Nos. 1 and 5 in Court, and no Test Identification Parade was conducted.

The evidence of the deceased’s brother and the alleged chance witness was considered partisan, unnatural and materially inconsistent; the latter admitted that he had not seen the assailants’ faces.

The medical evidence further weakened the prosecution case: the post-mortem doctor stated that the injuries were not on vital parts and were not likely to cause death, while the treating doctor found no external bleeding and recorded a history involving an iron pipe, contrary to the witnesses’ account of stick blows.

The possibility that complications from blood transfusion contributed to the death was also not excluded.

The alleged dying declaration was not produced because the police officer claimed to have destroyed it, constituting a serious investigative lapse.

The recovery of the string allegedly used to tie the deceased was likewise unsupported by evidence explaining its origin or how the deceased was untied.

In these circumstances, the trial Court’s view that the prosecution story was unreliable was a reasonable view supported by the record, not a perverse or legally impermissible conclusion.

Applying the heightened restraint applicable to an appeal against acquittal, the Court dismissed the State’s appeal and confirmed the judgment and order of acquittal dated 21 September 1998.

The bail bonds were cancelled, and the record and proceedings were directed to be sent back to the trial Court.