An uncorroborated oral dying declaration cannot sustain conviction when its authenticity and the declarant’s fitness are doubtful.

The appellant and Sunny Murmu had been living together as husband and wife for approximately two years following a love relationship.

The prosecution alleged that the appellant regularly assaulted Sunny and, on the relevant date, assaulted her at about 8:30 p.m. and drove her to her parental home.

Her mother, P.W.2, alleged that Sunny stated that the appellant had assaulted her with a jhanjhara or large kitchen skimmer.

Sunny was thereafter taken for medical treatment and died shortly thereafter from a head injury.

The appellant was charged under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.

The Sessions Court convicted him under Section 304 Part II IPC and sentenced him to five years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of ₹5,000, with six months’ simple imprisonment in default.

The prosecution examined six witnesses, including the deceased’s parents and relatives, the investigating officer, and the post-mortem doctor.

In appeal, the appellant challenged the reliability of the alleged oral dying declaration, the delay in lodging the FIR, the medical evidence, the non-recovery of the alleged weapon, and the alleged hospital treatment.

Whether the alleged oral dying declaration made by the deceased to her relatives was sufficiently reliable and made while she was in a fit state of mind to sustain the conviction.

Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant caused the deceased’s fatal head injury, notwithstanding the non-recovery of the alleged weapon and the medical evidence that the injury could have resulted from a fall.

Whether the discrepancies concerning the deceased’s condition, hospital admission, delay in lodging the FIR, and the number and nature of injuries entitled the appellant to the benefit of doubt.

The Court considered the offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part II of the Indian Penal Code, although the appellant had originally been charged under Section 302 IPC.

It applied the settled principle that a dying declaration may, if found wholly reliable and inspiring confidence, form the sole basis of conviction, relying on Atbir v. Government (NCT of Delhi) , (2010) 9 SCC 1.

The principle recognised in Rajendra v. State of Maharashtra , 2024 0 Supreme (SC) 473.

However, the declaration must be proved to have been made voluntarily, consistently, and while the maker was in a fit mental and physical condition.

Where material inconsistencies and circumstances create reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to acquittal on the benefit-of-doubt principle.

The Court held that the alleged oral dying declaration was not reliable enough to support conviction.

The prosecution witnesses gave inconsistent accounts regarding Sunny’s condition: several witnesses stated that she was unconscious or did not speak after reaching her parental home, while the alleged declaration was attributed to her by some of the same witnesses.

The exact words of the declaration were not proved, P.W.1 did not speak about any dying declaration, and the hospital doctor had refused treatment because of Sunny’s precarious condition, raising doubt about her capacity to make a coherent statement.

The alleged jhanjhara was never recovered, and the prosecution did not establish through the post-mortem doctor that the injury could have been caused by that object.

The doctor found only one injury and accepted that it could have resulted from a fall on a hard surface, contrary to the witnesses’ claims of injuries all over the body.

The unexplained delay in lodging the FIR, the contradiction regarding whether Sunny was admitted to the hospital, and the possible animosity arising from her relationship with the appellant further weakened the prosecution case.

These circumstances collectively created reasonable doubt as to the appellant’s guilt.

The judgment of conviction dated 27 February 2025 and order of sentence dated 28 February 2025 were set aside.

The appellant was acquitted by giving him the benefit of doubt and was directed to be released from custody unless required in any other case.

The criminal appeal was accordingly allowed.