Appointing Authority under Transitional Provisions retains power to terminate First Registrar for misconduct under General Clauses Act.

The Rajiv Gandhi National Aviation University was established under the Rajiv Gandhi National Aviation University Act, 2013

Respondent No. 1 was appointed as the "First Registrar" on 01.03.2019 by the Vice Chancellor following approval from the President of India (the Visitor)

During his one-year probation, his services were terminated on 08.01.2020. After several rounds of litigation, the High Court found the initial termination stigmatic and remitted the matter for fresh proceedings

Following a formal enquiry that proved charges of indiscipline and insubordination, the Visitor approved a fresh termination order on 20.04.2022, communicated by the Ministry of Civil Aviation (MOCA)

The Division Bench of the High Court subsequently quashed this termination, holding that the Visitor and MOCA had no jurisdiction over disciplinary matters of University employees

1. Whether the Visitor of the University or the Ministry of Civil Aviation (MOCA) had the jurisdiction to initiate and approve disciplinary action resulting in the termination of the First Registrar

2. Whether the appointment and removal of the "First Registrar" are governed by the general Statutes of the University or the specific transitional provisions of the Act

The court primarily applied Section 46(b) of the Rajiv Gandhi National Aviation University Act, 2013, which is a transitional provision stipulating that the "First Registrar" shall be appointed by the Visitor

It invoked Section 16 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which establishes the principle that the power to appoint includes the inherent power to suspend or dismiss the appointee

Additionally, the court examined Statute No. 28, which generally empowers the "appointing authority" to remove employees for misconduct

Section 20 of the Act, which designates the Steering Committee of MOCA as the interim Executive Council pending formal constitution

The Court reasoned that Section 46 of the Act is a transitional provision intended to bridge the gap during the University's inception, overriding the general Statutes

Since Section 46(b) explicitly designates the Visitor as the appointing authority for the First Registrar, the general rule under Statute No. 28—which normally places such power with the Executive Council—must be read alongside Section 16 of the General Clauses Act

Consequently, the Visitor, as the statutory appointing authority for this specific transitional post, possessed the legal competence to terminate the Respondent’s services for misconduct

The Court found the High Court’s conclusion—that the Visitor lacked jurisdiction—legally erroneous because it failed to distinguish between a regular Registrar and the First Registrar governed by transitional mandates

The Court set aside the High Court's finding regarding the Visitor's lack of authority. However, citing the expiry of the Respondent’s three-year tenure and the prolonged history of litigation, the Court declined to interfere with the operative relief (reinstatement/back wages up to a certain point) granted by the High Court

The appeals were disposed of without costs