Belagavi Oil Business Cannot Claim APMC Yard Entry As Of Right Without Trading Permission: Karnataka HC

The petitioner, which claimed to carry on an edible/cooking-oil business in Belagavi, alleged that the Agricultural Produce Market Committee (APMC) was preventing its vehicles from entering the APMC yard between 10:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m.

The alleged restriction was based on an oral instruction; the petitioner relied on its representation to the APMC dated 5 October 2026, but identified no written order imposing the restriction.

The APMC disputed the petition’s maintainability, contending that the petitioner held no licence or permission to trade in the market yard and was neither a trader nor a market functionary.

The petitioner sought a writ directing the APMC to consider its representation.

A writ of mandamus requires the petitioner to establish a legal or statutory right and a corresponding obligation on the respondent, together with refusal or breach of that obligation.

Under the Karnataka Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation and Development) Act, 1966, a “market functionary” includes specified persons such as brokers, commission agents, processors and traders.

“Market yard” means a specified place declared or deemed declared under the Act.

A “trader” is a person who buys notified agricultural produce for purposes other than domestic consumption.

The Act regulates entry and exit for persons intending to deal in notified produce within the market yard, and a person cannot claim a right of entry to trade there without the requisite licence or permission.

The Court also noted the petitioner’s reliance on Article 19(1)(g), but did not find that it established an enforceable right of entry in the circumstances.

The petitioner’s pleading did not establish that it was a trader or market functionary, that it dealt in notified commodities, or that it held a licence or permission to trade within the market yard.

Nor did it state why it needed to enter the yard.

The asserted restriction rested on an oral instruction, while the representation relied on by the petitioner was a letter sent by the petitioner to the APMC, not evidence of a written decision by the APMC.

Because the petitioner had not shown an underlying legal right to enter the yard, it could not establish a corresponding duty on the APMC to permit entry or to consider the representation as sought by mandamus.

It dismissed the writ petition as lacking merit.

The Court clarified that the petitioner could apply to the APMC for the necessary permission if it satisfied the requirements of the 1966 Act; the APMC was to consider such an application and pass an appropriate order if the petitioner was entitled to permission.