01Facts
On 29 May 2006, the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 entered into an agreement to sell House No. EWS-440 for ₹4,50,000, of which the plaintiff paid ₹1,00,000 as advance.
¶ 4–6, 16The agreement required the sale deed to be executed within four months.
¶ 4–6, 16The plaintiff claimed she arranged the balance, sought the Housing Board’s permission, and repeatedly called upon defendant No. 1 to complete the sale; defendant No. 1 denied signing the agreement and disputed her ability to transfer the property
¶ 4–6, 16The trial court decreed specific performance, directing defendant No. 1 to obtain the Housing Board’s permission if required, execute the sale deed, and deliver possession against payment of the balance consideration.
¶ 8–9Defendant No. 1 appealed under Section 96 CPC
¶ 102Issues
i.Whether the agreement to sell was executed by defendant No. 1 and the plaintiff paid the advance consideration of ₹1,00,000
¶ 7, 15–19ii.Whether the plaintiff established readiness and willingness to perform her obligations and was entitled to specific performance
¶ 15, 21–23iii.Whether the nature of the plaintiff’s interest in the property or the need for Housing Board permission prevented specific performance
¶ 20iv.Whether the passage of time and increase in the property’s value justified refusing specific performance or modifying the consideration
¶ 21–2403Law Applied
Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, provides for an appeal from an original decree.
¶ 1The court applied the principles stated in Kamal Kumar v. Premlata Joshi, (2019) 3 SCC 709: in deciding whether to grant specific performance, the court considers whether a valid concluded contract exists; whether the plaintiff was and remains ready and willing to perform; the extent and conformity of performance; the equitable consequences, including hardship; and whether alternative relief is appropriate.
¶ 22It also relied on Basavraj v. Padmavathi, (2023) 4 SCC 239, when addressing increased property value and directing additional consideration.
¶ 24Defendant No. 2 had invoked Section 54 of the Madhya Pradesh Griha Nirman Mandal Adhiniyam, 1972, concerning notice, but the court treated Housing Board permission as a procedural requirement to be obtained if necessary.
¶ 6, 20Provisions in the judgment · 1 · Linked ones open on LawLens
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 Section 96
04Reasoning
The court upheld the trial court’s factual findings because the plaintiff’s testimony, the attesting witness’s evidence, and the handwriting expert’s opinion supported execution of the agreement and payment of the advance; the evidence was not materially discredited in cross-examination.
¶ 16–19The plaintiff’s notices, efforts to secure permission, and continued pursuit of the sale supported her readiness and willingness, while defendant No. 1’s denial of her signature and failure to respond to notices weighed against her.
¶ 16, 23The court rejected the ownership objection, noting that the property was held on lease with a right to sell and that Housing Board permission could be obtained.
¶ 20It held that the prolonged litigation alone did not justify denying specific performance, but, taking account of the property’s increased value, required an additional ₹1,00,000.
¶ 23–2405Holding
The appeal was dismissed, and the decree for specific performance was affirmed subject to the plaintiff paying defendant No. 1 an additional ₹1,00,000 over the agreed consideration.
¶ 24–26The appellant was ordered to bear the costs of the appeal, and the decree was to be drawn accordingly.
¶ 24–26Original Court PDF
Shrimati Rajvansh KaurvsSmt.lata Batra And Anr.
Click to open original judgment
Original judgment, available to read, download and summarize on LawLens.in
