01Facts
The parties settled their dispute arising from proposed property transactions through Consent Terms dated 26 December 2024.
¶ 2–3Under those terms, Respondent No. 1 was required to complete the sale by 30 September 2025 and deliver physical possession within one year of execution.
¶ 2–3By order dated 23 April 2025, the Court disposed of the underlying Section 9 petition and recorded that the undertakings in the Consent Terms would be treated as undertakings given to the Court.
¶ 6–10The Petitioner alleged non-compliance and sought civil contempt action.
¶ 1, 4–5The Respondents disputed the authority and legality of the Consent Terms, denied wilful breach, and argued that the dispute belonged in execution proceedings.
¶ 18–21, 29–30The matter was before the Court at the preliminary stage of deciding whether to issue notice under Rule 1035 of the Bombay High Court (Original Side) Rules, 1980.
¶ 1, 4–5, 29–3002Issues
i.Whether the order dated 23 April 2025 and the Consent Terms contained sufficiently clear undertakings to the Court, and whether the alleged non-compliance made out a prima facie case for notice of civil contempt
¶ 1, 10–17, 46–47ii.Whether the Respondents’ challenges to the Consent Terms’ authority and validity, the availability of execution proceedings, and their denial of wilfulness required dismissal of the petition at the notice stage
¶ 18–21, 29–38iii.Whether limitation under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, barred the petition at this stage
¶ 44–4503Law Applied
Rule 1035 of the Bombay High Court (Original Side) Rules, 1980 requires a preliminary assessment of whether a prima facie case exists before contempt notice is issued; the Court need not determine guilt at that stage.
¶ 4–5Under Sections 2(b) and 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, civil contempt includes the wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court, and the breach must be deliberate rather than merely a failure to perform.
¶ 34–40Bajranglal Gangadhar Khemka v. Kapurchand Ltd., 1950 SCC OnLine Bom 12, recognises that an undertaking incorporated into consent terms and recorded by the Court may operate as an undertaking to the Court, but wilful default remains essential.
¶ 14–17, 34–35Kanwar Singh Saini v. High Court of Delhi, (2012) 4 SCC 307, and R.N. Dey v. Bhagyabati Pramanik, (2000) 4 SCC 400, establish that contempt is not a substitute for execution, although a distinct allegation of wilful breach of a court undertaking may be considered separately.
¶ 29–31Dinesh Kumar Gupta v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (2010) 12 SCC 770, and U.N. Bora v. Assam Roller Flour Mills Assn., (2022) 1 SCC 101, require conscious and wilful disobedience, not speculation or inference.
¶ 38Under Pallav Sheth v. Custodian, (2001) 7 SCC 549, Section 20 is applied by reference to when contempt proceedings were initiated.
¶ 45Provisions in the judgment · 5 · Linked ones open on LawLens
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 Section 9
Companies Act, 2013 Section 180
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 Section 2Section 18Section 20
04Reasoning
The Court read the Consent Terms together with the order recording them.
¶ 10, 13, 17, 46The fixed deadline for completing the sale, the separate deadline for handing over possession, and the express treatment of the terms’ undertakings as undertakings to the Court provided a prima facie basis to examine the alleged breach.
¶ 10, 13, 17, 46The challenges concerning corporate authority, Section 180 of the Companies Act, and the alleged Duress MOU required evidence and did not establish that the subsisting order had been set aside or stayed.
¶ 18–21, 27–28, 42–43Although execution remained the proper route to obtain conveyance and possession, it did not by itself foreclose examination of an alleged wilful breach of a court undertaking.
¶ 29–33Since the stated deadlines had passed and the material did not explain the non-performance, the Respondents should be called upon to explain; wilfulness and liability were left for later determination.
¶ 35–38The possession-related deadline also meant that limitation did not justify rejecting the entire petition at the preliminary stage, subject to any specific objection based on the filing date and breach alleged.
¶ 44–4505Holding
The Court held that a prima facie case was made out and issued notice to Respondent Nos. 1–6 to show cause why action for civil contempt should not be taken under Sections 12 and 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, for the alleged wilful breach of the undertakings in the Consent Terms and the order dated 23 April 2025.
¶ 47The notice was made returnable on 4 November 2026; Respondent Nos. 2–6 were directed to remain present at each hearing unless specifically exempted.
¶ 48–49The Court did not determine whether contempt had in fact been committed.
¶ 47Original Court PDF
Anchor Point Developer Private LimitedvsPmt Machines Limited
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