Buyers Keep Road-Exchange Plot As Allahabad HC Upholds Injunction, Says Pond Land Cannot Be Exchanged For A Fire Station

A link road constructed in 1987–88 used part of land belonging to the respondents’ predecessor. In 1988, the authorities proposed an exchange, allotting alternative land recorded as Gata No. 112; the predecessor’s name was mutated, and the respondents later purchased the land by registered sale deed dated May 14, 1990.

The respondents constructed a house and remained in possession. In 2007, the State began constructing a fire station on the disputed land, asserting that it was pond land.

The trial court decreed the respondents’ suit for permanent injunction and ejectment, finding them owners in possession; the first appellate court affirmed that decree. The State’s second appeal challenged those concurrent findings, including on the grounds that the land was a pond, the exchange was impermissible, and the civil suit was barred by Section 331 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (“UPZA&LR Act”).

Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 confines a second appeal to substantial questions of law.

The Court considered Sections 132 and 161 of the UPZA&LR Act in relation to rights in public-utility land and exchange, and Section 331 in relation to the civil court’s jurisdiction.

It applied the principle in Hinch Lal Tiwari v. Kamala Devi, (2001) 6 SCC 496, that ponds and other community resources have ecological and public-utility value and must be protected and restored, rather than treated as ordinary disposable property.

The Court also relied on the public-trust doctrine recognised in M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, (1997) 1 SCC 388, and on Jagpal Singh v. State of Punjab, (2011) 11 SCC 396, and Jitendra Singh v. Ministry of Environment & Others, (2020) 20 SCC 581, concerning protection of village common lands and ponds.

It further relied on Mangoo Singh v. Ram Autar, (2024) 5 All LJ 786, in holding that the suit was not barred by Section 331 in the circumstances of this case.

The Court held that the respondents’ rights could not be extinguished, nor their possession disturbed, merely by deleting their names from the revenue records; any cancellation of the allotment or dispossession had to follow the procedure established by law.

It also found that the respondents could not be deprived of both their original land used for the road and the alternative land without lawful proceedings.

On the pond issues, the Court rejected the State’s contention that an alternative parcel could justify using the existing pond for a fire station. Applying the public-trust doctrine and the authorities on pond protection, it reasoned that a pond’s ecological and community value is not interchangeable with ordinary land and that the State’s custodial role prevents it from treating the pond as an unrestricted proprietary asset.

The Court found the appellants had not established the essential ingredients of estoppel and, relying on Mangoo Singh, rejected the Section 331 bar.

It held that the existing pond could not be exchanged or diverted for construction of the fire station merely because alternative land was offered, and that the civil suit was maintainable.

The remaining questions were not separately examined.

The second appeal was dismissed as without merit.