Charge sheet issued by incompetent authority renders disciplinary proceedings void ab initio.

The applicant, Rajiv Lochan, was initially appointed as a Security Officer on 17.04.1989 and subsequently promoted to Deputy Chief Security Officer at AIIMS, New Delhi.

A complaint regarding irregularities in a security services contract led to the issuance of a major penalty charge-sheet dated 15.05.2014 under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965.

The charge alleged fudging of records, distorting facts in a comparative statement, enabling an ineligible firm to win a tender, and irregular payments causing financial loss and reputational damage to the Institute.

An Inquiry Officer was appointed and submitted a report on 09.10.2015, holding the charge as ‘proved’.

Based on this, the Disciplinary Authority (Director, AIIMS) issued a penalty order dated 14.09.2016, removing the applicant from service.

The applicant appealed this decision to the Appellate Authority (Institute Body of AIIMS), which rejected the appeal on 25.04.2018, confirming the penalty.

The applicant then filed the present Original Application challenging the penalty order and the appellate order.

The applicant contended that for Group ‘A’ posts (which he held), the Governing Body is the competent Disciplinary Authority for major penalties, and the Director is only competent to impose minor penalties (Sl. Nos. 1 to 4).

He further argued that the charge-sheet, even if approved by the competent authority, ought to have been signed and issued by the Director on behalf of the Governing Body or President, and not by the Chief Vigilance Officer, as was done in this case.

The respondents argued that approval was obtained from the President of the Institute, who is also the Chairman of the Governing Body, and thus, it was immaterial who signed the memorandum.

1. Whether the impugned penalty order dated 14.09.2016, Appellate order dated 25.04.2018, charge sheet dated 15.05.2014, Inquiry Officer report, and the entire disciplinary proceedings are illegal and arbitrary.

2. Whether the charge-sheet issued by an authority other than the Director, despite the Director being authorized to issue it on behalf of the Governing Body, rendered the disciplinary proceedings invalid.

The court primarily applied the principle that if a rule requires something to be done in a particular manner, it must be done in that manner alone or not at all, as established in *Taylor v. Taylor* (1875) 1 Ch.D. 426, 431.

It drew upon the precedent set by the Hon’ble High Court of New Delhi in *All India Institute of Medical Sciences v. S. P. Vashisht*, Writ Petition (C) No. 6525/2017, which affirmed the ratio of *B.V. Gopinath* (supra) and *State of Tamil Nadu Rep. By Secretary to Govt. (Home) vs. Promod Kumar IPS & Another*, Civil Appeal No. 8427-8428 of 2018.

These cases emphasize that approval for initiation of disciplinary proceedings is distinct from approval for issuance of a charge memo, and that the disciplinary authority itself must "draw up or cause to be drawn up" the charge memo to comply with rules like Rule 14(3) of the Central Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 and Rule 8(4) of the All India Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969, thereby protecting the underlying guarantee under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India.

The court also referred to the Hon’ble Apex Court's confirmation of *All India Institute of Medical Sciences v. S. P. Vashisht* in SLP No. 23219/2023 dated 25.02.2025.

The court noted that the facts of the case were "self-evident".

It found that the applicant, holding a Group ‘A’ post, was subject to disciplinary regulations where the Director was the competent authority to issue a charge-sheet on behalf of the Governing Body or President, even if approved by the competent authority.

The charge-sheet in the present case was signed and issued by the Chief Vigilance Officer, not the Director.

Citing the judgment in *Seema Jain v. The Rajasthan High Court*, Civil Writ Petition No. 10126/2016, the court emphasized that only the Disciplinary Authority can frame charges and that delegation of this power is impermissible, even if approval was obtained.

The court further relied heavily on the *All India Institute of Medical Sciences v. S. P. Vashisht* case, where it was held that while approval for initiation of disciplinary proceedings might be given, separate approval is required for the issuance of the charge memo itself, and the charge memo must be "drawn up or cause to be drawn up" by the disciplinary authority.

The court specifically noted that the Hon'ble Apex Court had confirmed this position, stating that "if the rule requires something to be done in a particular manner it should be done either in the same manner or not at all".

Despite the respondents' argument that approval from the Chairman of the Governing Body/President was obtained, the court considered the manner of issuance of the charge-sheet to be a critical flaw, concurring with the existing legal precedents.

Therefore, the present Original Application was partially allowed.

The court quashed and set aside the charge-sheet dated 15.05.2014, Inquiry Report dated 09.10.2015, Penalty Order dated 14.09.2016, and Appellate Order dated 25.04.2018.

The respondents were directed to reinstate the applicant in service with all consequential benefits, in accordance with the rules, within six weeks.

The respondents were, however, granted liberty to proceed against the applicant in accordance with the law and relevant rules.