Chowkidar’s Son Loses Claim To Father’s Post As Patna HC Applies Ruling Striking Down Bihar’s 2014 Nomination Rule

In brief

The question

1. Whether the petitioner could claim appointment under Rule 5(7) of the Bihar Chaukidar (Appointment) Rules, 2014, after the relevant provision had been set aside as unconstitutional.

The court held

The Court held that the basis of the petitioner’s claim no longer survived.

It also directed

The Court dismissed the writ petition.

01Facts

The petitioner sought appointment as a Chaukidar in place of his father, who had taken voluntary retirement and nominated him under the Bihar Chaukidar (Appointment) Rules, 2014.

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After his representation to the authorities remained undisposed of, he filed this writ petition seeking a direction for appointment.

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The State relied on the Division Bench decision in Devmuni Paswan v. State of Bihar & Ors., LPA No. 508 of 2022, which had set aside the relevant provision of Rule 5(7) as violative of Articles 14 and 16. The Supreme Court had declined to interfere with that decision.

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02Issues

i.1. Whether the petitioner could claim appointment under Rule 5(7) of the Bihar Chaukidar (Appointment) Rules, 2014, after the relevant provision had been set aside as unconstitutional.

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ii.2. Whether the Supreme Court’s refusal to interfere with the Division Bench judgment affected the petitioner’s claim under that provision.

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03Law Applied

Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution require public posts to be filled in accordance with the constitutional guarantees of equality and equal opportunity in public employment.

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In Devmuni Paswan v. State of Bihar & Ors., LPA No. 508 of 2022, the Division Bench held that the relevant proviso to Rule 5(7) of the Bihar Chaukidar (Appointment) Rules, 2014, was contrary to Articles 14 and 16 and set it aside.

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The Supreme Court declined to interfere with that judgment in SLP (C) No. 18983 of 2023 by order dated 19 March 2025.

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04Reasoning

The petitioner’s claim rested on the provision permitting a Chaukidar taking voluntary retirement to nominate a dependent for appointment. That provision had already been set aside by the Division Bench as inconsistent with the constitutional requirements governing public employment.

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The Supreme Court’s refusal to interfere left that judgment undisturbed; accordingly, the petitioner could no longer rely on the provision as the basis for appointment.

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