Co-delinquents facing substantially identical misconduct must receive parity in punishment absent distinguishing circumstances.

The petitioner, an Accountant employed by South Eastern Coalfields Limited (SECL), and the co-delinquent employee, K.S. Thakur, were proceeded against for alleged irregularities in clearing bills submitted by Dhruv Guard Private Limited.

The petitioner’s alleged misconduct related to bills for the period 1 June 2012 to 31 May 2013, while Thakur’s related to the period 31 December 2010 to 31 May 2012. Both were charged under Clauses 26.1, 26.5 and 26.22 of the applicable Standing Orders.

The petitioner was charge-sheeted on 21 November 2014 and, after departmental enquiry, was awarded stoppage of one increment with cumulative effect by order dated 4 February 2016. Thakur was awarded stoppage of one increment without cumulative effect by order dated 9 February 2016.

The petitioner’s departmental appeal, second appeal and review were dismissed on 15 March 2016, 15 June 2018 and 14 July 2020, respectively.

Whether the petitioner was entitled to parity of punishment with the co-delinquent employee when the allegations against both employees were substantially similar?

Whether the disciplinary authorities were justified in imposing stoppage of one increment with cumulative effect on the petitioner, while imposing stoppage of one increment without cumulative effect on the co-delinquent employee?

Whether the matter ought to be remitted to the disciplinary authority for reconsideration of the penalty rather than having the High Court itself substitute the punishment?

The Court applied the doctrine of equality under Article 14 of the Constitution in the matter of disciplinary punishment, holding that equally placed co-delinquent employees should ordinarily receive equal treatment.

Relying on State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Pal Singh, (2010) 5 SCC 783, it held that different punishments should not be imposed where the gravity and nature of the charges are substantially identical and no distinguishing circumstance is shown.

Under Rajendra Yadav v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIROnline 2013 SC 174, even a person found guilty may claim equality of treatment, and parity must be maintained among co-delinquents involved in the same transaction or incident.

Relying on Naresh Chandra Bharadwaj v. Bank of India, (2019) 15 SCC 786, read with Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Rajendra Singh, the Court reiterated that quantum of punishment is primarily for the disciplinary authority; judicial review is limited, but parity may be enforced where the employee and co-delinquent are completely comparable in the nature of charges and subsequent conduct.

Ordinarily, where punishment is disproportionate, the matter should be remitted to the disciplinary authority rather than the Court prescribing the penalty itself.

The Court found that the petitioner and Thakur held the same post of Accountant and were proceeded against in relation to similar irregularities concerning the clearance of bills of the same contractor.

Although separate enquiries were conducted by different authorities under different regulations, the respondents failed to demonstrate any material distinction in the nature or gravity of their alleged misconduct.

The petitioner had received the more severe punishment of stoppage of one increment with cumulative effect, whereas Thakur received stoppage of one increment without cumulative effect.

The respondents’ submission that the petitioner’s penalty was only a minor penalty did not answer the petitioner’s claim of equal treatment, since the challenge was based on comparative parity rather than the abstract classification of the penalty.

Applying the equality principle governing co-delinquents, the Court held that the petitioner should have been treated on the same footing as Thakur.

Consistent with the limits of judicial review over disciplinary punishment, it remitted the matter to the disciplinary authority for an appropriate decision rather than directly modifying the penalty itself.

The petition was accordingly disposed of, and the matter was remitted to the competent disciplinary authority to take an appropriate decision in light of the Court’s observations.

The exercise was directed to be completed within 60 days from receipt of the order.