Conviction based on sole eyewitness requires sterling testimony; doubts in corroboration entitle accused to benefit of doubt.

The appellants were convicted under Section 302/34 of the IPC for the murder of Bishambhar Singh Munda on 23.01.1996.

The informant (P.W. 1), the deceased’s cousin, alleged that while they were cycling to catch a bus for a court hearing in Ranchi, the three appellants intercepted and killed the deceased with a sword, farsa, and tangi.

The defense argued false implication due to a long-standing land dispute and suggested the deceased had many enemies due to his alleged bad character.

The Trial Court convicted the appellants based primarily on the testimony of P.W. 1.

1. Whether the evidence adduced by the prosecution is sufficient to establish the charge of murder under Section 302/34 of the IPC beyond reasonable doubt.

2. Whether the sole testimony of the eyewitness (P.W. 1) is reliable and sufficient for conviction in the absence of independent corroboration.

3. Whether the appellants are entitled to the benefit of doubt due to contradictions in witness testimonies and the background of bitter litigation.

The Court applied Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code regarding murder and common intention.

It emphasized Section 134 of the Evidence Act, noting that the quality, not quantity, of evidence matters.

Relying on *Bipin Kumar Mondal v. State of W.B.* and *Kalu @ Amit v. State of Haryana*, the court held that while conviction can rest on a solitary eyewitness, such testimony must be "wholly reliable" and of "sterling quality".

It further applied the "benefit of doubt" principle as articulated in *Rang Bahadur Singh v. State of U.P.* and the rule of "two possible views" from *Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra*, favoring the view consistent with the innocence of the accused.

The Court found that P.W. 1’s status as a "sterling witness" was compromised.

Although he claimed to be an eyewitness, P.W. 2 (a villager) testified that P.W. 1 did not name the killers when first reporting the incident.

P.W. 4 noted that P.W. 1 did not specify the weapons used, and P.W. 7 (a tender witness) provided an alibi for one appellant, stating he was ploughing fields at the time of the crime.

The Court noted the "natural conduct" of a witness would be to name assailants immediately; the failure to do so to P.W. 2 created a "vital omission".

Furthermore, the intense, decade-long land litigation between the parties suggested a high probability of false implication.

The lack of independent witnesses and the failure to seize material exhibits like the bi-cycle or blood-stained clothes further weakened the prosecution's link.

The Court set aside the Judgment of conviction dated 04.02.1998 and the Order of sentence dated 05.02.1998.

The appellants were acquitted, and their bail bonds were discharged.

The appeals were allowed.