Correction of date of birth cannot be sought at the fag end of service.

The petitioner, appointed as a daily-wage watchman on 1 February 1988, sought correction of his date of birth in the service records from 1 August 1964 to 10 August 1974.

He claimed that the incorrect entry resulted from a clerical error in the re-issued service book.

The petitioner submitted representations dated 7 May 2021, 2 May 2023 and 20 January 2025, and furnished an explanation with documents pursuant to the respondents’ notice concerning discrepancies in his Aadhaar and PAN records.

In an earlier writ petition, W.P. No. 10011 of 2025, the Court had directed the respondents to consider and decide his representation; according to the petitioner, the representation remained undecided and he was proceeded against for premature superannuation.

The petitioner invoked Article 226 of the Constitution seeking correction of his date of birth, quashing of the proposed/actual retirement based on the recorded date, and continuation in service with consequential benefits.

The State opposed the petition on the ground that the claim was raised at the fag end of service and was barred by delay and laches.

Whether the petitioner was entitled to correction of his date of birth in the service record from 1 August 1964 to 10 August 1974 after approximately thirty-three years of service and at the fag end of his service career.

Whether the petitioner could claim continuation in service and consequential benefits on the basis of the alleged correct date of birth when the service record had not been corrected in accordance with the applicable procedure.

The High Court applied the principle that correction of date of birth in service records must be sought in accordance with the applicable service rules and within the prescribed time, or, in the absence of such a provision, without unreasonable delay.

Even cogent or irrefutable evidence does not confer an automatic right to correction, particularly when the claim is made at the fag end of service; delay and laches, administrative finality, and the potential adverse effect on the promotional prospects of juniors are relevant considerations.

The Court relied on Union of India v. Harnam Singh, (1993) 2 SCC 162; State of Uttaranchal v. Pitamber Dutt Semwal, (2005) 11 SCC 477; Home Department v. R. Kerubakaran, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 155; Karnataka Rural Infrastructure Development Ltd. v. T.P. Nataraja, 2021 INSC 521; Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. Ram Samugh Yadav, (2020) 3 SCC 421; Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. Shyam Kishore Singh, (2020) 3 SCC 411; and other cited authorities, which establish that the recorded date of birth governs superannuation unless duly corrected, and that courts should not ordinarily direct alteration of the date of birth near retirement.

The Court also applied the principle that the service record has primacy in determining superannuation under Article 226 unless corrected through the prescribed procedure.

The Court found that the petitioner had entered service in 1988 but made his first request for correction only in 2021, after approximately thirty-three years of service.

This unexplained delay, coupled with the fact that the claim was raised at the fag end of his service, attracted the settled rule against entertaining belated requests for alteration of date of birth.

The Court held that the petitioner should have sought correction at the initial stage of his service and could not obtain continuation in service merely by asserting a different date of birth.

The potential chain reaction and prejudice to other employees awaiting promotion also supported refusal of relief.

The reliance on Shankar Lal v. Hindustan Copper Ltd., Civil Appeal No. 2858 of 2022, was rejected because that decision did not concern a claim made at the fag end of the employee’s career.

Since the recorded date of birth remained unaltered, the petitioner’s superannuation had to be determined on the basis of that service record.

It held that the belated claim for correction of date of birth was not maintainable and that the petitioner was not entitled to continuation in service or consequential benefits on the basis of the alleged date of birth of 10 August 1974.

The writ petition was dismissed for lack of merit, with no order as to costs.