Courts must adopt a liberal approach to condone short, non-negligent delays in appeals.

The petitioner sought condonation of a 27-day delay in filing a Regular First Appeal against the judgment and order dated 28 February 2026 passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 64 of 2021 by the Additional Civil Judge, Umreth.

The 4th Additional District Judge, Anand, rejected the delay-condonation application, Civil Misc. Application No. 51 of 2026, by order dated 29 June 2026.

The petitioner contended that the delay was neither intentional nor mala fide and occurred because the advocate had not communicated the trial court’s judgment in time.

The respondent did not file a written reply to the delay application, though an oral objection was raised.

The petitioner therefore invoked the High Court’s jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the rejection of the delay application.

Whether the Appellate Court erred in adopting a hyper-technical approach and refusing to condone the petitioner’s 27-day delay in filing the Regular First Appeal.

Whether the High Court, in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227, could set aside the order refusing condonation and direct registration and adjudication of the appeal on merits.

The Court applied the principles governing condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, under which an appeal may be admitted after limitation if the appellant establishes “sufficient cause.”

It held that “sufficient cause” must receive a liberal, pragmatic and justice-oriented interpretation where the delay is neither deliberate nor attributable to culpable negligence.

The Court relied principally on Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107, which held that refusing to condone delay may defeat adjudication on merits, that “every day’s delay” should not be applied pedantically, and that substantial justice should ordinarily prevail over technical objections.

The Court also exercised its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 to correct the Appellate Court’s legally inappropriate approach.

The High Court found that a 27-day delay was neither gross nor inordinate and that the petitioner had asserted that the judgment was not communicated by the advocate in time.

This explanation remained substantively uncontroverted because the respondent had not filed a reply to the delay application.

The Appellate Court had treated the fact that the same advocate later filed the appeal as undermining the petitioner’s explanation.

The High Court rejected that reasoning, observing that the advocate’s subsequent filing of the appeal did not make it impossible that the judgment had not been timely communicated to the petitioner.

Applying the liberal approach mandated by Katiji, the Court held that refusing condonation would improperly deprive the petitioner of a statutory appellate remedy and prevent consideration of the dispute on merits.

Since the delay was short and no prejudice arising from condonation was demonstrated, the Court considered it appropriate to grant relief without issuing prior notice, while preserving the respondent’s right to seek recall or modification.

The Appellate Court was directed to register the appeal and decide it on its own merits after hearing the parties, uninfluenced by the High Court’s observations.

The respondent was permitted to file an application for recall or modification within one month of receiving the order.