Deemed sanction cannot validate construction raised without prior permission on unconverted agricultural land.

The appellant constructed a one-storeyed pucca building measuring approximately 1,110 sq. ft. on Plot No. 44, Mouza Khudmorai, which was initially recorded as agricultural land.

The construction was allegedly commenced in 2016 without prior written permission or a sanctioned building plan from the Gram Panchayat and before conversion of the land to “bastu” classification.

On a complaint by Respondent No. 8, the High Court directed the Gram Panchayat to inspect the property, hear the parties, and determine whether the construction was unauthorised, while excluding questions of title and encroachment.

After inspection and hearing, the Gram Panchayat found the construction illegal and unauthorised and referred the matter to the Sub-Divisional Officer under Section 23(5) of the West Bengal Panchayat Act, 1973.

The Sub-Divisional Officer subsequently held that the appellant had not obtained prior permission and that his application dated 9 January 2023 was only for post-facto approval.

An order directing demolition was passed under Section 23(5).

The appellant challenged that order, but the learned Single Judge and thereafter a Division Bench upheld the demolition direction.

The Special Leave Petition against the appellate decision was dismissed, and the subsequent review application was also dismissed with costs.

The appellant later challenged the consequential communication of the Block Development Officer requiring him to vacate the premises before demolition.

Whether the appellant could invoke the doctrine of deemed sanction under Rule 30 of the 2004 Rules despite having constructed the building without prior conversion of the land and without intimating the Gram Panchayat of his intention to proceed with construction?

Whether subsequent conversion of the agricultural land and post-facto sanction could validate or regularise the construction already made without prior permission?

Whether the demolition proceedings and the BDO’s direction to vacate the premises were legally valid, particularly when the appellant had already been heard by the competent authorities and the earlier demolition orders had been upheld in litigation?

Whether the appellant was entitled to interim protection against demolition on the basis of the right to shelter and the possibility of filing a further Special Leave Petition?

The Court applied Section 23(1) and (5) of the West Bengal Panchayat Act, 1973, under which construction within a Gram Panchayat area requires prior written permission and unauthorised construction may be ordered to be demolished after hearing the owner.

Rule 26 of the West Bengal Panchayat (Gram Panchayat Administration) Rules, 2004 requires the Gram Panchayat to withhold permission for construction on land not recorded as homestead land until an order permitting change of classification is produced.

Rule 30 creates deemed permission only where permission or refusal is not communicated within the prescribed time and the applicant, after intimating the Gram Panchayat, proceeds in conformity with the submitted building and site plans; it does not protect construction already undertaken without such intimation or without compliance with Rule 26.

The Court further relied on the principles in Dipak Kumar Mukherjee v. Kolkata Municipal Corporation, (2013) 5 SCC 336; Supertech Ltd. v. Emerald Court Owner Resident Welfare Association, (2021) 10 SCC 1; Priyanka Estates International (P) Ltd. v. State of Assam, (2010) 2 SCC 27; Esha Ekta Apartments Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Mumbai, (2013) 5 SCC 357; and Kaniz Ahmed v. Sabuddin, 2025 INSC 610, that unauthorised constructions must be dealt with strictly, cannot ordinarily be regularised through equitable or judicial intervention, and must be demolished where they violate statutory planning requirements.

The Court held that the appellant’s construction was made before conversion of the land from agricultural to homestead use and without prior written permission or an approved building plan.

Rule 26 therefore operated as a statutory bar to the grant of permission until conversion was obtained.

The Court rejected the deemed-sanction argument because Rule 30 presupposes compliance with the prescribed application process and requires the applicant to intimate the Gram Panchayat before commencing construction; no such prior intimation was produced.

The Court further held that the appellant’s later conversion certificate and application for post-facto approval could not retrospectively validate a construction that was illegal when made.

The Court also treated itself as bound by the earlier decision of the coordinate Division Bench, which had already held that the construction was raised without Gram Panchayat sanction and on agricultural land before conversion.

That decision had not been disturbed by the Supreme Court, and the review application had been dismissed with costs.

Since the appellant had received inspection, notice, hearing, and repeated opportunities to contest the demolition, the principles of natural justice were satisfied.

The authorities’ subsequent direction to vacate was therefore a lawful consequential step, not an independent or arbitrary deprivation of shelter.

The Court held that considerations of poverty, family residence, or the asserted right to shelter could not justify preservation of an unauthorised construction contrary to statutory requirements and binding judicial orders.

The Court held that the construction was unauthorised because it was raised without prior permission, before conversion of the land, and without satisfying the conditions for deemed sanction under Rule 30.

Subsequent conversion and post-facto sanction did not cure the illegality.

The demolition directions issued by the Sub-Divisional Officer and the consequential steps taken by the BDO were upheld as valid.

The interim order was vacated, the authorities were permitted to proceed with immediate demolition, and the request for stay of the judgment was refused.