Delay alone cannot defeat amendment where it addresses the real controversy without changing the suit’s nature.

The petitioner-plaintiff instituted Title Suit No. 36 of 2011 before the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Haldia, seeking a declaration of absolute ownership and permanent injunction in respect of the suit property.

After the defendants filed their written statement, the plaintiff filed an application under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, on 14 July 2025, seeking to amend the plaint.

The proposed amendment stated that plot No. 252/633 was ejmali property devolved in equal shares upon Kalipada Bera, Haripada Bera and Nirapada Bera under a registered deed dated 14 February 1950.

The plaintiff asserted that he had no knowledge of the deed or the joint ownership at the time of filing the suit and acquired knowledge from the defendants’ written statement.

The Trial Court rejected the amendment application by order dated 29 August 2025, primarily in view of the delay and the nature of the proposed amendment.

The plaintiff challenged that order in the present civil revision.

Whether the Trial Court erred in rejecting the plaintiff’s application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC for amendment of the plaint on the ground of delay.

Whether the proposed amendment, which modified the plaintiff’s claim from absolute ownership to co-sharership based on the 1950 deed, changed the nature and character of the suit or prejudiced any vested right of the defendants.

Whether the amendment was necessary for determining the real controversy between the parties and ought to be allowed in accordance with the principles governing amendment of pleadings.

The Court applied Order VI Rule 17 CPC, under which pleadings may be amended where the amendment is necessary for determining the real questions in controversy between the parties.

The provision requires a liberal and justice-oriented approach where the proposed amendment is germane to the dispute, does not alter the fundamental nature and character of the suit, and does not cause prejudice incapable of being remedied through procedural safeguards.

The Court also applied the principle that delay, by itself, should not defeat an amendment when the amendment is necessary for effective adjudication and does not take away any vested right of the opposite party.

No specific judicial precedent was cited in the judgment; the Court relied on the settled principles governing amendment of pleadings.

The Court held that the proposed amendment did not introduce a wholly new or inconsistent case.

The plaintiff was not challenging the registered deed dated 14 February 1950; rather, he sought to bring his claim in conformity with that deed by accepting that the property was jointly held and by modifying his claim from absolute ownership to ownership as a co-sharer with his siblings.

The amendment was therefore consistent with, and substantially connected to, the defence disclosed in the written statement.

It was also germane to the real controversy regarding the parties’ respective rights in the suit property.

Although the application was filed fourteen years after institution of the suit, the Court found that the delay did not justify rejection because neither the nature and character of the suit was changed nor any vested right of the defendants was prejudiced.

The Trial Court had consequently adopted an unduly technical approach instead of the liberal approach required under Order VI Rule 17 CPC.

The amendment specified in the plaintiff’s application dated 14 July 2025 was allowed, and the plaintiff was directed to incorporate the necessary modifications and file an amended plaint before the Trial Court.

The Trial Court was directed to proceed with the suit in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible.

The civil revision was accordingly disposed of.