Delhi HC Sends Travel Firm’s ₹4.49-Crore GST Challenge To Appeal, Leaving Dispute Over Hearing Notices Open

The Respondent issued a show-cause notice under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (“CGST Act”), following an audit for FY 2019–20 to 2023–24.

The adjudicating authority confirmed a demand of ₹4,49,93,111, with applicable interest and an equivalent penalty, by an order dated 16 March 2026.

The order recorded personal hearings on 3, 11 and 19 February 2026.

The Petitioner claimed it did not receive the hearing notices and that they had been sent to an incorrect email address; the Respondent maintained that notices were emailed to the address in its records and had not bounced back.

The Petitioner sought to quash the order under Article 226, alleging denial of an effective hearing.

The Respondent opposed the petition on the ground that an appeal under Section 107 of the CGST Act was available.

Section 107 of the CGST Act provides a statutory appellate mechanism for challenging an adjudication order.

Although the existence of an alternative remedy does not oust the High Court’s jurisdiction under Article 226, the Court ordinarily exercises restraint where an efficacious statutory remedy is available; recognised exceptions include breach of fundamental rights, violation of natural justice, action without jurisdiction, and a challenge to legislative vires.

Assistant Commissioner of State Tax v. Commercial Steel Ltd., (2022) 16 SCC 447, was relied upon for these principles.

The Court also noted the relevance of Section 169 concerning service and Section 75(4) concerning the hearing grievance, without deciding their application to the facts.

The parties disputed whether the hearing notices were sent to the email address registered for the Petitioner and whether the hearing procedure afforded a meaningful opportunity to participate.

Resolving that dispute would require consideration of the email communications, registration particulars and related record.

The Court held that the Petitioner’s invocation of natural justice did not, by itself, require the Court to conduct that factual inquiry in writ proceedings, particularly when the appellate authority could examine the service issue, the treatment of the Petitioner’s explanations and the merits of the demand.

The writ petition was disposed of without expressing an opinion on the impugned order or the parties’ contentions; all contentions were left open for the appellate authority to consider independently and in accordance with law.

The Court further clarified that any application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, seeking exclusion of the time spent in the writ proceedings, should be considered by the appellate authority in accordance with law.