Delhi HC Upholds Shop Tenant’s Eviction, As Other Shops In The Property Were Not Shown Suitable For Landlady’s Son’s Electronics Business

The landlady sought eviction under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (“DRC Act”), claiming that the ground-floor shop was required for her dependent son’s proposed commercial business.

The tenant opposed the petition, alleging that other shops in the same property—including Shops Nos. 1466, 1467, 1470, 1476 and 1477—and Property No. 912 were available as suitable alternatives.

The Additional Rent Controller dismissed the tenant’s application for leave to defend and made an eviction order, finding no triable issue concerning alternative accommodation.

The tenant challenged that decision under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act; the revision challenge was confined to alternative accommodation.

Under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, the existence of another property does not defeat an eviction claim unless it is available and reasonably suitable for the landlord’s pleaded requirement; suitability must be assessed in context, and the landlord’s choice is not wholly unfettered (*M.M. Quasim v. Manohar Lal Sharma*).

A tenant raising alternative accommodation must provide particulars of the premises, the landlord’s right or title, its vacancy and availability, and its suitability for the pleaded need (*Lalta Prasad Gupta v. Sita Ram*).

The landlord’s business choice cannot be dictated by the tenant, and location and floor may bear on commercial suitability (*Anil Bajaj v. Vinod Ahuja*; *Uday Shankar Upadhyay v. Naveen Maheshwari*).

Under the proviso to Section 25B(8), the High Court exercises supervisory, not appellate, jurisdiction and does not reappreciate the evidence afresh; it examines the legality of the Controller’s decision-making process (*Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.*; *Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh*; *Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua*).

The Court found that the tenant’s identification of other shops did not, without material showing their availability and reasonable suitability, establish a triable defence.

The landlady acknowledged possession of Shops Nos. 1466 and 1467 but explained that their location, configuration and intervening hall differed from the subject shop, which was a two-side-open ground-floor corner premises; she also stated that the proposed business required about 2,000 square feet.

The tenant did not prima facie establish the landlady’s ownership or right to use Property No. 912, and the allegations concerning the other shops and rental advertisements did not establish that those premises were available and suitable for the son’s independent proposed business.

The Controller’s conclusion was therefore legally sustainable, and no material error warranting revisional interference was shown.

The revision petition was dismissed, the eviction order for the shop was affirmed, and the respondent was permitted to seek execution in accordance with law, subject to Section 14(7) of the DRC Act, if applicable.